Since
the inception of nuclear energy, anti-nuclear critics have been warning about
the vulnerability of nuclear power plants to sabotage. Recent events
indicate that we are moving closer to a period of global instability in which
state governments cannot protect against non-state actors who will deliberately
or unintentionally create a nuclear disaster.
This
week a group of Tatar radicals attacked electricity transmission lines in
Ukraine which deliver power to Crimea. The government of Ukraine has a well-known
dispute with Russia over its claim to Crimea, but it likely had no intention of
committing such a war crime that would endanger the lives of millions of
civilians and create further tensions with Russia. The narrow-minded attackers were
apparently unaware of the effect their assault would have on Ukrainian nuclear
power plants, but nonetheless two of them were cut off from the electrical grid
and had to use backup power. A report in Russia
Today quoted a Ukrainian energy company official about the seriousness of
the situation:
The
apparent act of sabotage in Ukraine’s Kherson region forced an emergency power
unloading at several Ukrainian nuclear power plants, which can be extremely
dangerous, according to the first deputy director of Ukraine’s energy company
Ukrenergo, Yuriy Katich. [1]
It
was backup power that was famously lost at Fukushima-Daiichi, leading to the
meltdown of three reactor cores and a melting of spent fuel in the Reactor 4
building. Thus these plants in Ukraine are just one step away from meltdown,
but it is likely in this case that backup power can be maintained until the
transmission towers are repaired. Yet the incident highlights how things will
go worse in the future when a similar event occurs in a failing state where fuel
for backup generators can't be supplied in time and the main transmission lines
can't be repaired.
Social
instability is also a factor now in France. The attacks in Paris on November
13, 2015 highlighted the inability of security agencies to identify and break
up groups of French citizens who are intent on committing acts of mass
violence. If they couldn't be found in the suburbs of Paris, how can we be sure
that they will be found among people who work at nuclear power plants? This
issue came to light in a report published in Le Journal du Dimanche on November 22, 2015 (translated below). It
was reported that French security agencies have been using religious
affiliation as a reason to deny access to nuclear power plants.
Everyone
would like to keep NPPs safe from deliberate acts of destruction, but there are serious
problems involved in trying to eliminate all risks. The security agencies are
using affiliations as the basis of exclusion, without any official charge of criminal
intent or conspiracy. Thus if an enterprise is so dangerous that large segments
of society have to be denied the right to work in it, in the vain hope that doing
so will prevent sabotage, it is worth asking whether this enterprise should
exist at all. Is there a safer way to boil water or to produce electricity
without boiling water?
______________
translation of:
Le
Journal du Dimanche (Sunday Journal)
by Matthieu Pechberty
November 22, 2015
Radicalization has affected nuclear power
plants operated by EDF (Électricité de France).
Authorities have already withdrawn access for dozens of employees since the
beginning of the year.
Since the
attacks [November 13, 2015], state authorities are on the lookout as they face
a rise in Islamic radicalization at EDF sites. During a meeting of the High
Commission for Transparency and Information on Nuclear Security (HCTISN),
the high commissioner for defense of nuclear security, Christophe Quintin,
acknowledged, without being more precise, that employees are being refused
access to nuclear power plants notably for reasons related to Islamic
radicalization. Michel Lallier, representative of the CGT [labor union] (Confédération
Général de Travail) confirmed, "He certainly spoke of
radicalization, even if his response was evasive. We'll never know exactly what
the security concern was."
At this
meeting, Mr. Quintin's assistant, Colonel Riac, emphasized the justification
for the lack of transparency of the authorities. A Greenpeace representative
who was at the meeting, Yannick Rousselet, said, "He clearly said he would
not state the reasons for the denial of access to an employee. It could be
because he frequented a radical milieu. He even acknowledged that these people
have not committed any offense and the judgment process is somewhat arbitrary."
The two officials were contacted, but did not return calls.
An employee at Flamanville targeted by DGSI
On November 4th, Christophe Quintin made an important
announcement. At a lunch conference devoted to information on nuclear sites, one
of the attendees reported that Mr. Quintin told the invited group that he estimated
"the services eject one person per week for the phenomenon of
radicalization." He explained that this surveillance applied to French
workers but less so to foreign workers and workers subcontracted by EDF. Each
year, the services of the state make 100,000 administrative inquiries for
73,000 workers (of which 23,000 are contractors)
In Flamanville, an employee of EDF told his story. Clément Reynaud, chemical engineer for ten
years, converted to Islam in 2010 and requested site management in 2012 to
provide a place for him to pray. After lengthy examination, EDF, which knew of
no similar cases, gave its approval. However, the security forces at the site
alerted the local offices of information services, which then became involved
in the case. Eighteen months later, Mr. Reynaud became the secretary of the
association that manages the mosque at Cherbourg. A police officer in Normandy
explained, "His file was taken to the national level by the DGSI (Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure). The case was judged to be serious." On
December 1st, Clément
Reynaud took a one-year leave of absence in order to create his own personal
coaching business for Muslims. He explained, "I want to help them organize
their lives to make time for the five daily prayers and for reading the Koran."
In August 2014, a Muslim engineer employed by an EDF
subcontractor was denied access to the nuclear power plant at Nogent-sur-Seine.
There again, the prefecture did not explain its motives for the decision, but
religion was at the heart of it. One year ago, Belgian authorities discovered
that a person who left to fight in Syria had spent several years working as an
engineer at the Doel NPP with access to the reactor. The plant is operated by
the French company Engie (formerly GDF Suez).
* The headline in the original article used the term dérives,
which has a softer connotation than radicals,
but it is difficult to find a similar term that is in common usage in English.
Dérive
implies one who has gone off the correct path, drifted, or become misguided.
These terms perhaps should be used in English to describe those who commit
violence in the name of religion, but instead the terms radical and extremist are
more common.
Note:
[1] "Ukraine
nuclear power plants ‘dangerously’ without power as towers feeding energy to
Crimea blown up," Russia Today,
November 23, 2015, https://www.rt.com/news/323060-ukraine-nuclear-plants-danger/
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