I first became familiar with the nature of
IAEA reports when I was desperate for information on the accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi, but it wasn’t long before I got a sickening feeling that these
reports, written in bureaucratic, disembodied prose, were glossing over the seriousness of the event, as if they were written
by accomplices to the crime. I didn’t quite know how to describe this
impression until I saw it done very well in a forum posting written by R. Cromack
of the Department of Nuclear Engineering, UC Berkley, shortly after the
accident at Fukushima Daiichi:
The nebulous, nonspecific, perversely detail-averse insistence
upon unhelpful platitudes, like "progress has been made" and the rote
repetition of what minimally successful steps are being taken to avert further
calamity, …and the slow, unheralded release of absolutely nightmarish
information.
Since
then, the information flowing out of the IAEA hasn’t improved. I stopped
taking this organization seriously and found much better analysis in just about
any other source. Even the national and corporate broadcasters in Japan were
becoming critical now that their TEPCO sponsorship money had melted away.
However,
I had become so appalled recently by the haphazard radioactivity
decontamination efforts in Japan that I was curious to see what the IAEA had to
say about them. As it turned out, my faith in both the national and
international management of the crisis sank even lower. In the paragraphs below
I offer commentary on a few outstanding passages of the recent IAEA report on
decontamination work in Fukushima prefecture.
"The decision making process shall provide for the involvement
of a wide range of interested parties in the definition, implementation and verification
of remediation programs and for regular public information exchange on the
implementation of these programs."
This
sounds wonderful, but somehow I doubt that the IAEA or Japanese regulators
seriously believe the Japanese authorities should involve all
interested parties. We can expect that interested parties will not include
anti-nuclear groups and the numerous scientists around the world who disagree
with IAEA-WHO conclusions about the health effects of low-level radiation.
"Managing expectations is essential."
Does
this require further comment? Managing expectations! The arrogant,
paternalistic assumption
here is obviously that knowledge and power flow from the IAEA and other pools
of expertise in the nuclear priesthood toward a public whose views have to be
manipulated.
In areas below 20mSv per year "...the ultimate decision whether
to remediate or not rests with the landowner."
Why?
Custom and law already dictate that private property owners are restricted in
many ways as to what they can do on their private property. Considering the
density of Japanese cities, and even of villages, there is no reason why an
individual should not
demand that a neighbor make every effort to reduce radioactivity on
his property.
"The team was impressed by the strong commitment to the
remediation efforts shown by Fukushima prefecture and the municipalities… The
team benefitted from visiting two school sites, from which the contamination to
a large extent had been removed in a well-organized manner by volunteers,
mostly parents and pupils. The Mission Team acknowledged the efforts of the
city administration and large number of volunteers as an important and
effective clean-up and self-help method.”
OK, a
nice tip of the hat toward the spirit of the cleanup effort, but note the mention
of “pupils.” Yes, the
IAEA experts express no explicit rebuke
that children were put to work cleaning up radioactive soil. However, in the
rest of the report there are remarks (see below) hinting that this was
unwise, but
unfortunately they are veiled in such diplomatic, vague language that they may have no
effect on the intended audience.
"The BSS [Basic Safety Standards] require that any measure
taken is justified to ensure that it does more good than harm and it is
commensurate with the risk… Usually, remediation actions also have social
and economic implications and decisions have to take into account all aspects of a
specific situation. The optimization of protection and safety - as required by
the BSS - is a process for ensuring that exposures and the number of exposed
individuals are as low as reasonably achievable... It requires both qualitative
and quantitative judgments to be made."
"The team recognizes and values the strategy of involving local
people to help themselves with the decontamination of their properties.
However, it has been noticed that for more complex work the need of specialized
services will be required... it is important to observe that appropriate
training, supervision and technical assistance are given. Radiation protection
and monitoring should also be in place when integrating local people in
remediation work."
"...the exposure of workers undertaking remedial actions is
controlled in accordance with the relevant requirements for occupational
exposure… Remediation work may generate residues that contain enhanced levels
of activities. According to the BSS, it is the responsibility of the government
to set reference levels for the disposal of residues in municipal landfills or
for landfills to be designed in particular for the disposal of those
residues."
“Activities!”
George Orwell would smile sardonically if he could see the contortions of
language dreamed up in this report. Translation of “activites”: radiation emitting particles.
"...due to the strict activity limits for foodstuffs, the
intake of food is very likely not an important pathway, its contribution to the
doses should be explicitly assessed."
Again,
the IAEA team seeks to
rebrand radioactivity as merely “activity.” They show here that they are
impressed with the Japanese government’s efforts to keep contaminated food off
the market. This is completely at odds with the public’s extreme wariness about
the safety of the food supply. The IAEA makes no mention here of the failure to
intervene early with farmers in Fukushima prefecture to keep contaminated beef
off the market – to mention just one example.
"Access to the 'Deliberate Evacuation Area' is free and
unmarked. The team encourages considering the use of appropriate
indications/markings in the routes and simple instructions for the public when
entering or leaving these areas."
Good idea,
but is there any way this could be said a little more forcefully?
"Since radiation is a natural part of our environment, the key
issue is to establish reasonable and credible limits (reference levels)
regarding exposures that need to be reduced... It is therefore important to
avoid classifying those materials that do not cause exposures that would
warrant special isolation measures as 'radioactive waste.'"
Here we
go again with the condescending reminder that radiation is natural. Yes, we all
know that by now. Some of us even know what IAEA experts know but refrain from
saying: Many fission decay products are not found in nature. They didn’t exist
on this planet before 1945. Naturally occurring radon is an inert gas that
doesn’t play a role in biological mechanisms. On the other hand, strontium 90 did not exist on
earth before 1945, and it
behaves chemically like calcium in organisms and causes bone cancer and leukemia.
However, it is hardly mentioned at all in the reporting of radionuclide data,
even though every expert in the field knows it was emitted in significant
quantities in a predictable ratio to the cesium that was released. Why the
silence? It could be because the some of the most compelling evidence linking radiation to health
effects is found in the studies of baby teeth of American children who were
exposed to atomic weapons testing in the 1950s and 1960s (see The Tooth Fairy Project).
Other studies show that levels “below regulatory concern” emitted from nuclear
power plants are also seen to accumulate in baby teeth.
"Several socio-psychological elements play an important role in
the decision making process. Therefore, the key issues include stakeholder
involvement..."
Here is
another mention of stakeholder involvement, but the wording here hints
that the psychological
maladjustment of the public will need to be massaged into acceptance of a
message handed down from above.
"...the main strategy adopted by the Japanese authorities
relates to the concept of decontamination. At this stage, it is important to
stress that decontamination is only one of the many available options to be
used to achieve the reduction of doses..."
Bloggers
have more aptly described the recent obsession with decontamination as
desperate, pathetic, hopeless, dangerous, misguided, and other such terms.
Perhaps this is what the IAEA experts were quietly thinking to themselves as
they observed cleanup efforts. As usual, though, everything they write has to
be couched in such diplomatic, face-saving language that it is doubtful that
the urgency of the rebuke will register with the intended target.
"The major strategy being considered is the removal of top soil
(up to 5 cm of the soil layer) due to the well-known behavior that radiocesium
accumulates in this part of the soil.... [but this]... also involves the risk
of generating unnecessarily huge amounts of residual materials. If removal of
the top layers of the soil is one of the selected options for wider use, a
similar system would be useful that is in place for naturally occurring
radioactive material residues... This would allow the removed material to be
used in selected applications, e.g. together with clean material in the
construction of structures, banks, reclamations or roads that will not pose
undue risks to members of the public. This system is known as clearance.
“Used in
selected applications!” “Clearance!” Again we see here the IAEA equating anthropogenic,
biologically harmful radionuclides
with naturally occurring radioactive isotopes that are found in soil at low
levels. They suggest that cesium and strontium can just be diluted into
concrete and landfill and used for roads and riverbanks, and this dubious practice can be called “clearance”
to make it sound less revolting.
"It is important to avoid classifying as 'radioactive waste'
such waste materials that do not cause exposures that would warrant special
radiation protection measures… The measurements indicate that a large part
of the contaminated material collected from clean-up actions at urban
demonstration sites is only slightly contaminated. The adequate pathways for
such material could be found outside of the category of radioactive
waste."
This
directly contradicts the IAEA’s adoption of the linear no threshold policy
which states that there is no cutoff line below which radiation has no harmful
effects on living things. Indeed, there are levels of cesium deposition below
which a population seems to suffer few detectable harmful consequences. In the
most pessimistic studies of Chernobyl, in the areas with more than 185,000
Bq/m^2 in the soil, poor people with no access to uncontaminated food developed
many health problems, but below this level causal relations become
less clear.
People
in New York state might take some reassurance from this when they learn that
weapons testing fallout left only a few hundred Bq/m^2 on farmland. Then
again, we know that cancer rates have increased in recent decades, and we know
that the cause of cancer can never be traced to a definite source.
People
in Chiba prefecture (200 km south of Fukushima) might take some comfort from
knowing that TEPCO dumped “only” 20,000 Bq/m^2 on the local rice
farms. But there remains the theoretical possibility that one atom of cesium in
my muscle tissue is enough to trigger the growth of a malignant tumor. As a
stakeholder in this issue, whose input is so valued by the IAEA, I might want
to say that I have zero tolerance for having to live with an “acceptable” level
of these fission products in my neighborhood.
"The team draws the authorities' attention to the potential
risk of misunderstandings that could arise if the population is only or mainly
concerned with contamination concentrations [Bq/m^2 for surfaces, or Bq/m^3
for air] rather than dose levels. The investment in time and effort in removing
contamination beyond certain levels from everywhere, such as all forest areas
and areas where additional exposure is relatively low, does not automatically
lead to reduction of doses for the public. It also involves the risk of
generating unnecessarily huge amounts of residual material."
The IAEA
makes a good point here. An effort to decontaminate all the forested areas of
northern Japan would definitely be futile. The more practical solution is to
keep people away from the contamination, but this forces the admission that
these areas have been lost to society as places to enjoy and exploit.
"Since the provisional regulation value for radioactivity in
rice is 500 Bq/kg, the conservative transfer factor of 0.1 implies that the
limit of cultivation for the rice field soil is 5,000 Bq/kg. [converts variably, depending on soil, by a
factor of 40-60 to give a figure in Bq/m^2, thus 200,000 Bq/m^2 is OK for rice
farming].
However, the first preliminary results from the demonstration sites established
by the Japanese authorities in the affected areas indicate that the actual
transfer factor is likely significantly lower... The team is of the opinion
that the conservatism in the transfer factor can be removed when the tests are
completed and realistic factors have been firmly established."
The
words “conservative” and “conservatism” are used throughout the IAEA report as
a poor substitute for “sensible precaution.” Caution always seems sensible,
while conservatism can sometimes be called into question. While the Japanese
public seems to feel that its government has been too complacent about setting
limits and monitoring the food supply, the IAEA suggests here that they have
been engaged in too much “conservatism.” It is suspicious that previous studies
on the transfer rate of cesium from soil to rice grains are now suddenly wrong.
Japanese authorities have determined, after one experiment, that “the actual
transfer factor is likely significantly lower.” How convenient that this result
was obtained for the nation’s staple food supply.
"The team recognizes that in the early phase of the accident,
conservatism was a good way to manage uncertainties and public concerns... For
the next cropping season there is room for removing some of the
conservatism..."
Again
with the conservatism?!
If there had been any conservatism, all farmers over a wide area of northern
Japan would have been told to take the season off, and compensated for their
losses. Instead, the public was sold the idea that they should support
Fukushima by buying its agricultural products. In the worst case, heavily
contaminated beef found its way into school lunches in Yokohama. By the time of
the harvest, the public had lost confidence in the safety of the food supply,
and most consumers sensibly engaged in “conservatism” by avoiding all products
from northern Japan, regardless of claims as to their safety.
"... validated models of urban decontamination were already
developed by the international community and provided with sets of model
parameters and practical measures for cleanup. The mission team was not in a
position to understand to what extent these models are utilized."
Translation of
the magnificent understatement:
Japanese authorities have made no effort to learn about established protocols.
The cleanup effort has been random, chaotic, improvised, and dangerous.
"The mission team encourages the Japanese authorities to
continue the useful monitoring of freshwater and marine systems…. Remediation
of these areas was not addressed in detail by the Japanese counterparts during
the meeting with the mission team. However, the exposure to members of the
public through this pathway generally is of minor importance."
What a
relief. After all, it’s only the freshwater supply!
"The current waste management strategy is considering the
collection of contaminated material in dispersed temporary storages prior to
consolidation in a smaller number of interim storages, pursuing large scale
incineration of combustible material in available municipal solid waste
incinerators equipped with electro-static precipitators and bag houses....
It should be noted that a major proportion of the very large volumes of
generated material that is to be collected will likely be only slightly
contaminated.... The adequate characterization of collected material will then
allow the distinction between material that can be unconditionally cleared,
conditionally cleared and material that has to be managed as nuclear
waste."
Again,
the report mentions the foolishness of declaring all radioactive materials as
radioactive waste. There has been much media coverage
of the plan to burn organic materials and sewage waste which contain high
levels of cesium (and of course, other dangerous radionuclides which are never
mentioned). Critics have been alarmed by the apparent stupidity of such a plan
because it would only “revolatilize” the radionuclides into the air so that
they fall once again over the land. This IAEA report is the first mention I
have seen of “electro-static precipitators” that can capture the fly ash which contains most of the
radionuclides. Do they really solve the problem (assuming the fly ash will be stored properly as
nuclear waste)? A
couple of sources I checked were optimistic, but these come from studies
favored by the energy industry.
Assuming that all
of the uranium and thorium would be emitted into the fly ash and that the
electrostatic precipitators would capture and remove 99% of the fly ash, the emissions of
radioactive trace elements to the atmosphere from a 1000 MW coal-fired power
plant would be 52 kg/yr of uranium and 128 kg/yr of thorium. The average annual radiation dose received by
a person from all sources … is 360 millirem. The annual radiation dose (from naturally
occurring radioactivity in coal) received by persons living within 80 km of a
coal-fired power plant is estimated to be 0.03 millirem.
The authors
make some questionable assumptions without explaining the rationale for them.
Another study on this technology found different
figures for the efficiency of precipitators:
Electrostatic precipitators on the stack
of Unit No. 2 of the Neal Station removed over 70% of the radionuclides
entering the stack in association with fly ash, and thus the precipitators
appear to be of value in controlling radionuclide emissions. Other particulate emission
control devices, e.g., bag houses, should also be very effective in removing
radionuclides that enter the stack in association with fly ash.
Shall I quibble over the difference between
these studies? 70%
is close enough to 99%, isn’t it? The crucial difference between these studies
and the problem in Japan is that I suspect coal
has levels of radionuclides that are orders of magnitude smaller than the what
is found in the sewage sludge and organic waste in northern Japan. The 1 – 30%
of the radionuclides (perhaps more if these studies are wrong) that might
escape from smokestacks could still be a significant amount in terms of health
impacts.
"Pursuing a management strategy for all of these contaminated
materials as radioactive waste due to over-conservatism would lead to enormous
challenges in the timely establishment of a completely new infrastructure with
regard to human resources, transportation and large facilities for processing
and storage... it would probably result in delays in the clean-up to allow
displaced citizens to return and continue their lives as early as
possible."
The gist of the IAEA report is that Japanese
authorities have been thinking too much about decontamination and not enough about
reducing exposure to radiation in practical ways. The report says overly
ambitious decontamination efforts will get in the way of allowing “displaced citizens to
return and continue their lives as early as possible," but this is a
contradiction. In order for people to return, they will need to feel that
decontamination has been thorough, cautious and complete. People will not want
to return if they know that the effort has been constrained by the realities of
limited public will to help them, or that it is just
impossible.
If the radiation around one’s home and the village school ground have been “mitigated,”
that’s a partial fix. Yet the local farmers cannot grow food and people cannot walk in
the local forests, or fish in the streams. The village doctor had
the financial resources to retire early and leave, and no young doctor is
likely to replace her. In various other ways, the village is not what it once was. How can this be construed as “the continuation of their
lives?”
The report is correct for implying that a widespread decontamination
effort would be ill-advised, but wrong for suggesting that people should return
as early as possible. The questions the report raises are rather whether it is the radionuclides that can be practically
removed from the land, or the people, and whether people should be forced to live a compromised life
on damaged land. Perhaps it’s time to think about
giving them homes elsewhere.
The report makes it clear that resources will be constrained by “socio-psychological
elements” and “social and economic implications.” “Expectations will have to be
managed;” that is, reduced. Why does this agency of the United Nations, which
is normally so concerned with human rights and the dignity of the individual,
promote this idea that victims of a nuclear disaster should go back to land
that can now provide them with only a life much diminished from what it once
was?
Aside from
the IAEA’s concern for remediation of the situation in Fukushima, there is
something else that the Japanese people and the world need more than platitudes
about recovery and the continuation of lives. It would be nice to see an
expression of contrition from this international agency for failing to press
Japan to give up its nuclear industry before the Fukushima accident. It is now
obvious to the world, and to many nuclear engineers, that the most seismically
dangerous place in the world should not be home to dozens of nuclear reactors.
All of these reactors, as well as the fast breeder Monju reactor and the fuel
reprocessing site in Rokkasho, have been built upon wishful assessments of
earthquake intensity, height of tsunamis, and location of fault lines. More
than ineffectual reports on cleanup efforts, we need an international overseer
who will speak frankly and harshly to Japanese reactor operators who will
continue to take reckless risks. It was years of cautious, diplomatic
hesitation to save Japanese face that led the IAEA not to openly criticize
Japan for its long record of corruption and mishaps. This team encourages considering the abandonment of over-conservatism in
criticism of the Japanese nuclear industry. This
team favors the use of appropriately strong criticism, punishment,
international humiliation and enforcement to prevent the next Japanese
earthquake-tsunami-meltdown syndrome, a real and present danger which could
have a much greater global impact than the present catastrophe.
