2013/01/08

Japan's Ongoing Decontamination Fraud


More than a year and a half since the nuclear crisis, much of Japan’s post-Fukushima cleanup remains primitive, slapdash and bereft of the cleanup methods lauded by government scientists as effective in removing harmful radioactive cesium from the environment.

“Even if a method works overseas, the soil in Japan is different, for example,” said Hidehiko Nishiyama, deputy director at the environment ministry, who is in charge of the Fukushima cleanup. “And if we have foreigners roaming around Fukushima, they might scare the old grandmas and granddads there.”

- Hiroko Tabuchi. “In Japan, A Painfully Slow Sweep.” The New York Times. January 7, 2013.

For the past year my fifteen-year-old son has been coping with the pressure of his last year of Japanese junior high school. This is the year when everyone’s fate narrows considerably. Students are tested continually and nudged toward the high schools considered to be the most suitable match for their standardized test scores. Education is mandatory only up to completion of junior high school, and the government has never built a free public secondary education system that can take in all students who want to attend. Instead, Japan allowed a complex system of government-subsidized private schools to meet the demand. The best alternative is usually the top-ranked public school within commuting distance, but entry is extremely competitive. Some public schools are middle ranking or lower. These are accessible to many students who are not high-scoring on tests, but many families opt to pay extra for private schools.
The ultimate goal for the children who aim for the top in this system is to enter the prestigious universities such as Keio, Waseda, University of Tokyo and University of Kyoto, and a few others. The political, business and bureaucratic elite is made up of graduates from these schools. The great mystery of this system is how this tribe of the supposed best and brightest could be so dumb and ethically bankrupt in their response to the radiological contamination of Fukushima prefecture, as well as in other matters of national leadership.
This month The Asahi Shinbun (this link contains links to Parts 1-3 of the report) broke an investigative story that finally blew the lid of the obvious fraud that has been called the “decontamination” of areas affected by the Fukushima catastrophe. The New York Times reported on the story a few days later.
Since the decontamination program began, thousands of citizens, bloggers and whistleblowers have decried the meaningless waste of money spent on the impossible task of undoing the contamination. It’s nice that a major media organization finally got around to making this a legitimate story.
The fraud is, or should be, an enormous scandal. $7.4 billion dollars was budgeted for decontamination and doled out to various firms that had dubious and varied levels of expertise in handling radioactive materials. Domestic and foreign companies with proven potential for real decontamination work were neglected in favor of politically connected construction companies who have done slapdash work. The work was done properly, for public relations displays, only around official monitoring posts. Elsewhere, soil, vegetation and water were just moved from one place to another. Permanent storage spaces, sealed off from the environment, were in most cases not sought because everyone involved knew there was no permanent solution. People doing the work were not properly protected. A spokesman for the contractors, quoted in the New York Times article, acknowledged that their methods were not as effective as those of the specialized companies, but they defended themselves by saying only their methods were cost-effective – which is another way of saying no one ever had any intention of paying for real decontamination work. When people complained to both the local and national levels of government, there was no follow up or enforcement of the stiff penalties that were legally possible.
Of course, the bureaucrats who dreamed up this plan are not stupid, as I sarcastically stated above. They know exactly what they are doing. They have to create a false perception of the catastrophe’s implications. They want to declare the evacuated territories safe and clean and put residents back onto their contaminated land. These people must be sacrificed for the sake of restoring the nation’s energy policy and the lies about the safety and necessity of nuclear energy. So while bureaucrats and politicians may not be stupid enough to sincerely believe that this decontamination is not ridiculous, they are evidence that Japan’s education system erodes the ethical sensibilities that emerge naturally in children, and that is not an easy achievement.
The problem is that intelligence and morality are not really independent of each other. Unethical policies are stupid because they erode faith in government and the will to solve problems collectively (see picture below). This country could literally cease to be if leaders don’t get over their preoccupations with hosting the 2020 Olympics, singing the national anthem and boosting defense spending in order to hold onto the Senkaku Islands.



An additional problem is that cynical, unethical motives require one to play dumb, and this must take a toll on one’s soul. For example, you have to put your country $7.4 billion further in debt for a plan that everyone can see will not succeed in its stated aims, and you have to pretend you can’t do calculations with these big numbers or put this spending in a sensible perspective with other potential uses of the money.
These days children in their early teens are forced to learn advanced math that earlier generations never saw until late secondary school, but somehow adult math literacy has been dumbed down by elite bureaucrats. There is no public understanding of what $7.4 billion means, and reporting on financial matters doesn’t contain simple calculations or comparisons that would help the public understand.
So here is some perspective. The new Chernobyl containment structure cost $0.768 billion, and this was an amount that the EU and the United States took a very long time to cough up. Even though the new structure was needed to prevent Europe from being exposed to a “second Chernobyl,” and it is a miniscule amount compared with what has been spent to rescue Greece from financial default, it was apparently a difficult matter to get the funding for it. On the other hand, the conservative, “fiscally responsible” government of Canada has had no problem spending $1.2 billion to clean up radioactive contamination in the small town of Port Hope – home to the Cameco nuclear fuel processing facility. This little problem in Canada hardly registers in the history of nuclear energy, but for some reason the money was available. So what’s a billion dollars? Obviously, not much these days. What matters are the values and ethical judgments we make in deciding how to spend a billion dollars.
If the brilliant elite graduates of the Japanese bureaucracy wanted to stop ignoring what are simple math questions but difficult ethical questions, they could easily calculate how much $7.4 billion would give to each of the 150,000 people who were forced by government order to evacuate from Fukushima:  

7,400,000,000 / 150,000 = 740,000 / 15 = $49,333

So let’s add a bit onto the national debt and round that up to $50,000. That’s $200,000 for a family of four, enough for them to go somewhere far away and start life over. It’s not justice, but it’s not a bad deal compared to the option of staying put. The alternative is to move back to a town which will not be decontaminated and never repopulated to its prior level. The well-known pattern of disaster zones is that those with skills and resources leave and never come back, while those who do come back inhabit a town that goes into inevitable decline. But the real goals of the decontamination project were never meant to help the people affected. As it was put by a resident quoted in The New York Times, “It’s clear the decontamination drive isn’t really about us anymore.” The evacuees are sacrifices for the bigger project of minimizing damage to the reputation of nuclear energy, which, like decontamination, will prove to have been a futile endeavor.

Other statistics on national spending and revenue in Japan (in YEN)

national debt
1,000,000,000,000,000
annual interest paid on national debt
10,500,000,000,000
annual revenue
42,000,000,000,000
recently announced 2013 budget
103,400,000,000,000
ratio of budget to revenue
2.45:1
decontamination project
650,000,000,000
recent addition to defense budget
180,000,000,000
annual interest % of annual revenue
25.0
decon. project % of annual revenue
1.5
decon. project % of annual interest
6.1

Data in the above table reported by Kyle Bass and The Japan Times

US$1 = 88 yen (2013/01/08) 

2013/01/05

Top man in Belgium's nuclear regulatory agency played Santa Claus to anti-nuclear lobby


“In all honesty, if I consider the risk, I would choose other forms of energy.”
- outgoing head of Belgium’s Agence Fédérale de Contrôle Nucléaire (AFCN), December 24, 2012

It is sometimes interesting to hear the frank thoughts of retiring politicians and officials, and more interesting when they try to bring about the change that was impossible in their official roles. Al Gore is famous for his campaign to raise awareness of global warming. Mikhail Gorbachev atoned for Chernobyl by establishing Green Cross, Jimmy Carter worked for Habitat for Humanity and Bill Clinton organized the foundation of a public health care system for Rwanda. George H.W. Bush has a reputation for enjoying golf and the lecture circuit, but he too has supported various good causes. It seems like powerful people can do more for the world after they are out of power, if they decide to use their public profiles and retirement time well.
A recent addition to this list might be Willy De Roovere. He’s not a former world leader, but he is a rare nuclear industry insider who was willing to publicly discuss the problems with nuclear energy that have become evident in the post-Fukushima world. Speaking as the head of a nuclear regulatory agency, it is remarkable to see him express these doubts. It is unthinkable that a top French, American or Japanese regulator would dare to express such misgivings about nuclear energy policy. In fact, directors are literally not allowed to express any personal opinions based on their years of experience in the industry. What they say in their official capacity must always be the official line that is the compromised, consensus view of the director’s allies and foes within the agency. However, on the eve of retirement, things can be different.
The report below is a translation of an article in Le Monde that appeared in late December, 2012. I was waiting to see if English language media would pick it up, but none did, so it fell on me to translate it for the English speaking world.

Le Monde 2012/12/27
Jean-Pierre Stroobants
Brussels
(translated from the original French report)

The director of the Belgian Agence Fédérale de Contrôle Nucléaire (AFCN) until the end of the year, Willy De Roovere, caused a sensation in his country by calling into question the safety of the industry. “We should ask ourselves if the risk of nuclear is still acceptable,” he explained on Monday  December 24, on a public Flemish language radio broadcast. This top regulator managed in the past, among other responsibilities, the Doel nuclear power plant, one of two in Belgium.
“In all honesty, if I consider the risk, I would choose other forms of energy,” added Mr. De Roovere in this interview, evoking the economic risks linked to such a decision. Every industry carries some risk, he continued, “but it is very difficult in the present period” to make the population accept the risks associated with nuclear energy - in particular, in a territory as densely populated as Belgium, where an evacuation could involve hundreds of thousands of people. Mr. De Roovere explained in another interview published on Tuesday in the Belgian daily Le Soir, “My thoughts are a consequence of the catastrophe in Fukushima. With nuclear the risks are low, but the consequences of an accident can be extremely serious.”

“The existing power plants must be watched very closely.”

The director of the AFCN feels that from now on it is appropriate, in Belgium and in Europe, to avoid constructing more nuclear power plants. As for existing ones, “They must be watched very closely,” he declared. With regard to next generation reactors, Mr. De Roovere insists, “Each country should debate while keeping in mind the principal question: what is the level of residual risk that is acceptable for the population? I suppose this discussion took place in France when there was a decision to construct an EPR reactor.”
Nonetheless, Mr. De Roovere has a reassuring attitude about the regulation of Belgian nuclear installations. If he thinks the controls can never exclude the possibility of a failure, he states, “we can ensure that a failure will not lead to a catastrophe. And, until now, no discovered faults in the facilities have posed any risk to the population.”
The comments by the top person at the agency came as a surprise because two Belgian reactors, Tihange 2 and Doel 3 have been stopped since August. Their reactor vessels had numerous micro-fissures. Operated by Electrabel, subsidiary of GDF Suez, these reactors are the most modern of seven reactors in Belgium, and they supply 30% of electricity consumption in the country.
The AFCN will have to decide, probably within twenty days, if it will authorize their restart. It is the successor of Mr. De Roovere, Jans Bens, another former director of Doel, who must make this decision. This past summer, the AFCN announced that it was “skeptical” about a restart of Doel 3.

In Europe, safety inquiries have not always been convincing.

Electrabel declared in early December that Tihange 2 and Doel 3 could restart immediately. Teams of electricians, assisted by foreign experts, confirmed that international standards had been met at the time of construction of the power plants. The metal of the reactor vessels is sound and bubbles had resulted from minimal flaws caused by hydrogen.
These bubbles were formed at the time when the vessels were forged by a Dutch company, Rotterdamsche Droogdok Maatschappij (RDM). At the time when the reactors were stopped, the former head of this corporation rejected this theory.
The final decision of the AFCN, which is a prelude to the final decision by the Belgian government, will be followed with interest in other countries. This is because RDM sold twenty similar reactor vessels throughout the world. Also, in the aftermath of Fukushima, there is strong concern about all nuclear installations in Europe. The inquiries that have been launched by the European Commission attempted to be reassuring, but they haven’t convinced all parties.
On the other hand, the Nuclear Forum, a Belgian lobby group, believes that stress tests have proven that nuclear power plants in Europe, and particularly in Belgium, are safe. It finds Mr. De Roovere’s position “incomprehensible.”
After various reversals, several months ago the Belgian authorities adopted a timetable for moving beyond nuclear. It plans a definitive stop of five reactors in 2025, and Doel 1 and 2 are to stop in 2015. The decision was made before conclusive tests were complete, which leaves the door open to other changes in the plan.
Unless a crisis of supply – a real possibility evoked in an official report last May – comes along to upset these plans.

2012/12/30

Abe's Debt Bomb

Happy New Year. Out with the old, in with the new, or year going, year coming, as they say in Japan. This week: Prime Minister Abe prepares to detonate the debt bomb, spurious data on Japan’s “surging” fossil fuel use, and contemplating nuclear war without nuclear weapons.


The Fukushima Daiichi NPP catastrophe would pose enormous challenges to any country, even to one with the best material circumstances to respond to it. To understand why Japan is so dismally unable to decommission the site and give a better life to its victims, one has to take account of dire lack of human and financial resources that Japan has even for its normal functioning, let alone for recovery from a massive natural disaster and what may be the largest industrial accident in history.
The problem is that few people in Japan, from its leaders to its kindergarten students, are even aware of how bad things are. For the last twenty years, Japan has been living by borrowing the savings accumulated by the post-war generation that rebuilt the country. Since this borrowed money has allowed the nation to maintain a comfortable standard of living, few are aware of just how bad things are going to get. Pretty soon, the cheap supply of money will be gone.
One person with the professional credentials to alert the world to this coming crisis is J. Kyle Bass, founder of Hayman Capital in Houston, Texas. He is famous for having foreseen the subprime crisis and for having protected his clients from it. Since then he has been warning of the dangers of sovereign debt.
In a video of his keynote address at the AmeriCatalyst conference on October 1, 2012, Kyle Bass had much to say about the frightening day of reckoning that is in Japan’s near future. Notes on the parts of his keynote address pertaining to Japan are below:

1.           The quantitative analysis of the global debt crisis is already done. It is now only a matter of when and how the consequences will be realized.
2.           In the past ten years, total global credit market debt (sovereign obligations, corporate and household debt…,) has gone from $80 trillion to $200 trillion – this is 11% compound annual growth rate. This rate is way ahead of global population growth (1.2%) and GDP growth (3.8%).
3.           We know from history how this ends. This ends with war, which is economic entropy played to its logical conclusion.
4.           Global debt is 340% of global GDP.
5.           Post WWII, 48% of countries decided to restructure their debt.
6.           We have already seen social unrest over food and entitlements. What we have seen in Greece, for example, is not just a little social unrest.
7.           We all react to pessimistic forecasts with the optimism bias. We admit bad things will happen, but we think they will happen elsewhere to other people.
8.           Another sign that history is repeating itself in is in the recent expression of nationalism between China and Japan over the Senkakus, islands which, despite what you have heard, have no resources worth fighting for.
9.           Many people fail to see looming crises because they believe axiomatic truths (truths deemed to be true only because everyone repeats them) such as “real estate always goes up.” An axiomatic truth about Japan is that its debt doesn’t matter because “Japan is self-funding” – that it doesn’t borrow money outside Japan, so things will be alright. This is simply not true.
10.        We are slow to see crises coming because doomsday beliefs don’t help us, so we don’t want to believe them even though they may be accurate.
11.        The end won’t be announced. The people managing the crisis and making decisions in back rooms believe, “When it becomes serious you have to lie.” Their job is to promote confidence. [This is strikingly similar to what happens in a nuclear emergency. Preventing panic is believed to be a justifiable sin.]
12.        Japan has a debt to GDP ratio of 211%. This is far higher than some other developed nations that are considered to have serious problems with a ratio of around 100%.
13.        There is 1 x 10E+15 yen of debt in Japan [that’s a 1 followed by 15 zeros, or one thousand trillion. Or it’s 1.17 x 10E+13 US dollars at 85 yen/dollar, which is $11.7 trillion. US debt: $16 trillion, with a GDP and population both about 2.5 times those of Japan]. Japan's debt can never be repaid.
14.        There will be a bond crisis in Japan in the next 2 to 3 years.
15.        Japan now spends 10.5 trillion yen/year on interest, while it brings in only 42 trillion yen in revenue.
16.        If interest rates go from where they are now (less than 1% and very close to zero) to 2% or higher, Japan will be in default. Every yen of revenue will have to go to interest payments. This is very simple math that many smart people refuse to acknowledge.
17.        A trade surplus turns into corporate profits and wages which become savings that can be used to fund government bonds.
18.        Self-funding of deficit spending is possible only if the trade surplus is large enough. Japan is now showing trade deficits, but even a surplus can be insufficient if it is not big enough to fix the problem. The only choice is to print more money or be a capital importer. Both of these alternatives lead to higher interest rates on the national debt.
19.        Competition for foreign investment will be severe when Japan has to borrow internationally. Who will buy Japanese bonds at 0.5% if they can get higher returns by buying the bonds of other countries? In the past, investors settled for the low returns on Japanese bonds because of the strength of the yen and the economic stability of the country. These strengths will not exist in the future.
20.        The homeostasis of the past 20 years cannot continue. Japan is at the end of its rope.
22.        Similar problems exist elsewhere. The Asian trade surplus is at its lowest in recent history. The world is about to enter an era of sovereign restructurings.

Just before the recent Japanese election, Kyle Bass added to his October speech by writing on his blog about the ill-advised economic policy that the new prime minister, Shinzo Abe, wishes to follow: 

“Japan is already running a minus $100 billion trade balance…, and the country's GDP has been hit by Chinese boycott stemming from the Diaoyu/Senkuku islands dispute… We think Abe is a shoo-in. And he said he's going to do everything possible to get to 3 percent inflation. He doesn't even know what he wishes for because if he gets there, he detonates his debt bomb.
  When there's a press release put on the BOJ's website from the MOF, the BOJ and the government — that's analogous to Bernanke, Geithner and Hillary Clinton issuing a joint press release saying 'we're going to end deflation'. This is how it begins to happen. Their backs are against the wall. They have a full crisis. They absolutely have to change the manner in which they deal with their currency.”

Interestingly, for the past two weeks the Japanese media have been awash in the new axiomatic truth that because TEPCO stocks, and the stock market in general, responded favorably to Abe’s inflationary plans, this must mean that economic recovery is at hand. I heard this view repeated several times by people around me, even by my students who are, at all other times, blissfully ignorant of current events.

Spurious claims about fossil fuel imports

Kyle Bass’ analysis should be taken seriously, but the discussion needs to expand to the broader issues of environmental preservation and avoidance of conflict and social upheaval. Obviously, the implications are enormous. If every yen of government revenue has to go to service debt, that means there will be no money for education, health care, pensions, defense, and none for cleaning up the legacy of Japan’s fifty-year experiment with nuclear power. The debt bomb leaves nothing for decommissioning the wreckage of Fukushima Daiichi, nothing for decommissioning aging reactors, nothing for a final storage solution for the nuclear waste now in temporary storage. And definitely nothing for the 160,000 nuclear evacuees.
Furthermore, the fiscal crisis tempts policy makers to see further use of nuclear power plants as the solution to the trade deficit.  Nuclear fuel is indeed extremely cheap compared with the cost of importing fossil fuels. There are the future costs of decommissioning and spent fuel storage, but no one is going to worry about those in a crisis. As usual, push that one off onto future generations. The other large cost is construction of the plants, but that has already been done. In fact, all the money sunk into the nuclear industry could be considered as regrettable addition to the national debt, a lost opportunity to invest in renewables and energy efficiency. Even if everyone could agree that it was a horrible error to go down the nuclear road, the logic dictates that they might as well use the facilities that have been built.  On the other hand, it might be wiser to see the Fukushima catastrophe as a final warning about operating nuclear plants in a land riddled with seismic fault lines. The Japanese government risks destroying the whole country with another nuclear accident, but with their backs up against the wall, this is the sort of desperate kamikaze behavior politicians now favor.
In addition to the Fukushima catastrophe, the nuclear industry wasted trillions of yen in national treasure before 2011. One of the largest nuclear plants in the world, TEPCO’s Kashiwazaki, has been offline since the 2007 Niigata earthquake because of newly discovered fault lines that weren’t supposed to be there. Fault lines keep appearing under other existing reactors. The reprocessing facility in Rokkasho and the fast breeder Monju reactor have wasted trillions of yen also, without having ever produced any of their promised benefits.
It is a dangerous illusion to be tempted to go back to nuclear as a fix for the fiscal deficit. It is folly to carry on with a dangerous technology that has devoured, and will continue to devour, so much of the nation’s wealth.
Nonetheless, there is an emerging axiomatic truth that Japan needs to reduce fossil fuel imports in order to mitigate economic decline. It has been repeated often in the domestic and international media throughout 2012, but the numbers don’t seem to back up the claim.
OECD data reports that its member countries use the majority of fossil fuels for transport, heating and industrial applications, and non-energy uses such as plastics. I couldn’t find any data on Japan itself, but it is not likely to be much different from the average of OECD countries (which Japan belongs to). Before 2011, about 20-30% of Japan’s electricity was produced by nuclear energy, and after the shutdown of nuclear plants this had to be covered by increased use of fossil fuels. But electricity is not the biggest part of energy consumption. The International Energy Association reports, for example, “In 2009, heat represented 47% of final energy consumption [worldwide], compared with 17% for electricity, 27% transport; and 9% for non-energy use.”
Much of the reporting on the energy crunch caused by the loss of nuclear has framed it as a sudden 40% (or larger, the figures vary widly) increase in fossil fuel imports, but the increase of course has to be much smaller when it is seen as an addition to fossil fuel imports for all purposes, not only for electricity generation.
Japan gets all its fossil fuels through imports, and according to the World Bank, for the last decade in Japan, energy derived from fossil fuel accounted for about 81% of all energy produced. The rest came from hydro, nuclear and renewables. If this is the case, how could the loss of nuclear power cause such a crippling disaster for the balance of trade? At most, the increase in fuel imports would have been 10-15% if we imagine adding to the 81% figure above (assuming renewables and hydro would account for the remainder). If it had really been such a crisis, there would have been a conservation program aimed at reducing the biggest factor in fuel imports - consumption of fossil fuels for transportation and heating. There would have been fuel rationing in a real emergency. Instead, all the talk was of the need to conserve only electricity, and even that attempt wasn’t as severe as it could have been. The cigarette vending machines stayed on, and people were told to keep shopping to support the economy.
The Federation of Electric Utilities of Japan provided this data about the spike in fuel imports, comparing January 2011 and January 2012:




Mark Caine, a research officer at Research Officer at the London School of Economics, used the above table to write an obfuscating report about Japan’s energy crunch. It is typical of how the power companies and the media confused the public about how Japan consumes fossil fuels:

“The Federation of Electric Power Companies, an industry group representing Japan's largest electric utilities, has just released new data on Japanese fossil fuel imports for January 2012. The data reveal that last month, despite an overall drop in economy-wide energy use, Japan imported and consumed far larger quantities of fossil fuels than it did in January 2011 [italics added], before its earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster upended its economy and energy system.”

He states, “Japan imported and consumed far larger quantities…,” but what is obscured here quite deliberately is the fact that this data refers not to fuel imports by Japan as a whole but to fuel imports by Japan’s electric utilities. Their purchases increased, but purchases for transportation and other uses did not. Later in the report he writes, “To meet surging demand for these fossil fuels, Japanese utilities increased imports of fuel oil by 165%, crude oil by 174%, LNG by 39%, and coal by 12%. It appears that much of this fuel was used for thermal power generation.” If not for thermal power generation, what might have these electric power companies used the fuel for? In any case, even if this sentence now uses the factually correct grammatical subject “Japanese utilities,” the numbers still seem suspicious. If nuclear used to account for 30% of electricity generation, how could its loss cause these increases of fossil fuel imports of over 150%? The government’s own charts show fossil fuel generated electricity going from about 60% to 80%, only a 33% increase (Japan Agency for Natural Resources and Energy. 2012 White Paper on Energy, p. 132). The public is clearly being deceived.
The hand-wringing over fossil fuel imports appears to be a well-crafted public relations trope that has succeeded in winning back some public sympathy for the restart of nuclear plants. However, the fact that Kyle Bass didn’t mention the energy crunch at all lends support to my theory that it is a cynical distraction. People who have been paying attention to Japan for a long time know that its severe demographic, economic and fiscal problems had started long before March 2011. For that matter, the nuclear industry had been bruised and battered for a long time as well. The one good thing about Fukushima Daiichi is that it woke people up to the overlooked hazards of other plants: Kashiwazaki, Shika, Hamaoka, Tsuruga, Mihama, Higashidori, Rokkasho, Monju – so many with newly discovered problems that even if the new Nuclear Regulatory Authority decides that some plants are safe to restart, the future costs of decommissioning all the unsafe ones will be staggering expenses lasting for decades.

Nuclear War without Nuclear Weapons

As if this sobering fact were not enough, I have to conclude with Kyle Bass’ rhetorical question (at 5:00 in the video referenced above): “You know how this ends, right?... This ends through war… it’s economic entropy played to its logical conclusion.”  A war among developed countries - for example, the U.S., Japan and China fighting over control of the South China Sea – is almost impossible to imagine. It would be like no war the world has ever known.
All wars since WWII have involved conflict between or within developing nations (which were often proxy wars between superpowers) or between superpowers and developing nations. One type of conflict that hasn’t happened in seventy years is direct conflict among superpowers and developed nations. When London, Tokyo and Dresden were being bombarded during WWII, there were no nuclear power plants. If there had been, Japan and Europe would have been rendered uninhabitable. We know what happened when Chernobyl exploded, and that it could have been more devastating if a second explosion had not been averted. The frightening question to contemplate concerns what would happen today if a similar conflict erupted between China and Japan, or any other pair or alliance of countries with nuclear power plants.
A modern war would proceed much like the 1990-91 Gulf War on Iraq. Before troops marched in, attackers would aim to soften up the enemy, to destroy infrastructure and the ability of the enemy to wage war. Electricity supplies would be knocked out, so nuclear power plants would be forced to rely on backup power, but it would be unlikely that they could keep it going long enough. Supplies of emergency diesel fuel would be unreliable, and the main grid might not be repairable while the country was under attack. If things got really ugly, there could be deliberate or accidental bombing of nuclear power plants or spent fuel storage sites. Some facilities are supposedly built to withstand air plane crashes, but consider the vulnerability of spent fuel storage, especially the ruins of Fukushima’ spent fuel pools.
The existence of four hundred nuclear plants around the world might be a deterrence in the same way that nuclear arsenals are. If hostile nations rationally assess the risks, they will be deterred from escalating tensions with any nation that has a civilian nuclear capacity, let alone one with nuclear weapons. During WWII, American forces began planning for the occupation of Japan while they were still bombing it, which is the reason they spared the Imperial Palace and a few other locations. In the same way, aggressors might refrain from creating a nuclear wasteland in a country they might want to exploit or occupy at some future date. Or they might refrain from creating a nuclear catastrophe that would impact wide regions beyond the countries involved in the conflict. On the bright side, another kind of deterrence lies in the fact that so many developed countries have little for aggressors to covet. It is doubtful that anyone would want to occupy and govern a country that has the nuclear fallout and wreckage of Fukushima Daiichi to clean up – a job that is to be done by a population that now needs more adult diapers than baby diapers. The recently elected Japanese hawks talk so much about the need for better defense, but they fail to see that this goal may have already been achieved. If you want to be safe from attack, wear an old coat and drive an aging, rusted car.

Further reading:

Martin Walker. "Japan's Looming Crisis." UPI.com. November 19, 2012.

Khosrow B. Semnani, Gary M. Sandquist. "The Next Chernobyl?" The New York Times. January 2, 2013.
A contrary view: 
Joe Weisenthal. "Kyle Bass's Most Famous Trade Is A Disaster, And It Is Never Going To Work Out." Business Insider. May 20, 2012.

2012/12/25

The Reset Button


I’m taking a break from the typical doom-and-gloom story and trying to go with something more uplifting for this Christmas Day of 2012. Actually, it was just hard to think dark thoughts while I was enjoying a Mont Blanc aux marrons Christmas cake with my family on Christmas Eve, and it was hard to forget the story of the man who made it.
Naritoshi Satou was a fifth generation baker and owner of a patisserie in Ishinomaki, Miyagi prefecture. This town is famous now as one of the places hit hardest by the tsunami of 2011. He and his wife and four children survived by running to higher ground, but their bakery and their home were completely destroyed. They evacuated and stayed with relatives in Chiba prefecture, then quickly got to work rebuilding their lives in a new place. Four months after the earthquake-tsunami-meltdown disaster, their new patisserie in Narita, Chez Nari, opened its doors.
NHK News heard about them and did a report on their shop in the early summer of 2011. You can watch it here. Even if you don’t understand Japanese, it’s easy get the meaning from the images and fill in the blanks on their recovery story.
Chez Nari, Kozunomori 2-15-13, Narita-shi, Chiba-ken, Japan 286-0048
There are probably people back in Ishinomaki who think he abandoned the community that is trying to rebuild the town, but I suspect most people don’t resent him for the personal choice he made. Others might say there was a slightly insensitive twisting of the knife in the way NHK used one family’s story to fill the need for a feel-good story about the disaster. After all, not everyone had the social and financial capital to get out and start over somewhere else, and the promotion of stories like this carry an implication that victims don’t need government support or a systematic solution to their problems. The message could be taken as an admonition to just bootstrap, expect nothing and get on with your life.
These reservations aside, there is clearly something inspirational and instructive in Mr. Nari’s reaction to his situation. He quickly overcame the emotions and excessive sentimentality that can cloud the decisions of people faced with catastrophic changes in their circumstances. Even though he had roots in the community and in the family business going back 120 years, he realized quickly that the life he had known until then was definitively over. Rebuilding would be slow and uncertain, lasting through the formative years of all his children. Compensation from government and insurance companies would be an insulting pittance. In hindsight, it was an insane risk to live so close to the sea, and rebuilding in the same area would be even crazier. He chose not to spend his time in a temporary housing facility, ruminating over the past while waiting years for rebuilding plans to ferment within the layers of local, prefectural and national bureaucracies. Perhaps the best way to help the locals was to show them an example of someone making it in a new place.
Mr. Nari’s story is instructive on a deeper level as well. It’s not only about starting over in a new place with new people. It’s about doing what once seemed impossible, leaving behind ways of living and thinking that once seemed indispensable. It should be obvious that there is a larger lesson here about the fear we have of leaving behind our familiar ways of producing energy and solving the global financial crisis.
Best wishes and thanks to everyone who has read this blog since the summer of 2011. It has had 14,000 page views from countries on every continent. This is a small fraction of what a Justin Bieber video gets in an hour, but a thousand times more than the readership of my last research paper for an obscure academic journal. Comments pro or con are always welcome.  

2012/12/18

The Air Conditioned Nightmare II


A few months ago, I wrote about Henry Miller’s travelogue The Air Conditioned Nightmare (written 1939-42, published 1945), and noted how striking it was that he had a prophetic sense of the ominous changes about to happen to the world. It was not just a matter of him being aware, like everyone at the time, that the world was hurtling toward a massive war for the second time in twenty-five years. He had been living in France during the years of the Great Depression, and when he returned to America and traveled across it by automobile, he actually didn’t pay much attention to the material poverty. Instead, he saw new machines and material comforts everywhere. Alongside the desperate joblessness he also saw people mad to acquire cars just so that they could commute to work and sit in air-conditioned offices all day. He was most aghast at the spiritual change in people:

"A great change had come over America, no doubt about that. There were greater ones coming, I felt certain. We were only witnessing the prelude to something unimaginable. Everything was cock-eyed, and getting more and more so. Maybe we would end up on all fours, gibbering like baboons. Something disastrous was in store - everybody felt it. Yes, America had changed. The lack of resilience, the feeling of hopelessness, the resignation, the skepticism, the defeatism - I could scarcely believe my ears at first. And over it all that same veneer of fatuous optimism - only now decidedly cracked." (p.13)

Henry Miller couldn’t have known about the top-secret Manhattan Project underway at the time, but he must have been aware of headlines of the early 40's reporting on the splitting of the uranium atom. These headlines appeared in The New York Times before the Manhattan Project got underway:

·   Vast Energy Freed by Uranium Atom; Split, It Produces 2 'Cannonballs,' Each of 100,000,000 Electron Volts Hailed as Epoch Making, New Process, Announced at Columbia, Uses Only 1-30 Volt to Liberate Big Force. Jan. 31, 1939.
·   The Week in Science; When Uranium Splits Doubtful Source of Power Cancer and X-Rays Neutron Possibilities News Notes. March 5, 1939.
·   Vision Earth Rocked by Isotope Blast; Scientists Say Bit of Uranium Could Wreck New York. April 30, 1939.
·   Release Largest Store Known on Earth A ‘Philosopher’s Stone’ When Separated in Pure Form It Can Yield 235 Billion Volts Per Atom of Its Own. May 5, 1939.
·   New Key is Found to Atomic Energy; Actino-Uranium Is Credited With Power to A Mixture of Physics and Fantasy. March 17, 1940.
·   Vast Power Source in Atomic Energy Opened by Science; Report on New Source of Power. May 5, 1940.
·   Third Way to Split Atom Is Found By Halving Uranium and Thorium; Scientists at University of California Say Cleavage Creates Much Energy -- Tokyo Men Also Report Uranium Fission. March 3, 1941.
·   Scientist Reaches London; Dr. N.H.D. Bohr, Dane, Has a New Atomic Blast Invention. October 9, 1943.
·   Research Institute is Seized in Denmark; Germans Are Expected to Work on New Secret Weapon. December 12, 1943.

(List of references made by Korean Minjok Leadership Academy)



This quote is from an article in Scientific American in 1939:

“The latter problem brings up an interesting and rather disturbing aspect of the case. These secondary neutrons constitute a fresh supply of ‘bullets’ to produce new fissions. Thus we are faced with a vicious circle, with one explosion setting off another, and energy being continuously and cumulatively released. It is probable that a sufficiently large mass of uranium would be explosive if its atoms once got well started dividing. As a matter of fact, the scientists are pretty nervous over the dangerous forces they are unleashing, and are hurriedly devising means to control them.
It may or may not be significant that, since early spring, no accounts of research on nuclear fission have been heard from Germany — not even from discoverer Hahn. It is not unlikely that the German government, spotting a potentially powerful weapon of war, has imposed military secrecy on all recent German investigations. A large concentration of isotope 235, subjected to neutron bombardment, might conceivably blow up all London or Paris.”


   In hindsight we can see that the nuclear age and the permanently militarized economy was Miller's premonition of “something unimaginable” that was being born. His insight might have been less prophetic and more just wise observation of changes happening in the world. However, in choosing his title, he couldn't have consciously known that the new technology of air conditioning would play such a crucial role in building atomic weapons. For how many people even today know that coolant technology has been essential to every nation that has enriched uranium for nuclear fuel and weapons?
Since the UN and nations of the world applauded themselves for signing the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, they have all done a good job of not mentioning that uranium enrichment processes were exempted from the agreement. If you do internet searches for exemptions to the protocol, you’ll find some for asthma inhalers and other uses that account for trivial amounts, but you won’t find mention of the large consumption of CFCs (chlorofluorocarbons) used in uranium enrichment since 1987. It seems to have been tactfully left unmentioned in UN documents that were meant to tout the victory and not allow the public to question the judgment that nuclear was clean and green enough to be given a pass on its ozone depleting emissions. Although no one wanted to draw attention to the exemptions, CFC pollution by the nuclear industry has long been an open secret, and it is not denied by the polluters themselves.

have built an atomic bomb while under Allied Forces bombardment. Essential facilities like this would have been impossible to hide.
The additional problem with CFCs is that, as well as being ozone depleters, they are said to trap heat 10,000 to 20,000 times more effectively than CO2. Thus the carbon footprint of nuclear energy (mining, processing, construction of plants, cooling of fuel, decommissioning of plants, decontamination, transport of waste, storage of waste) takes a huge increase when you consider the energy used to run the cooling systems and the impact of leaks of coolant. A 2004 report from the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research described the recent history of American enrichment facilities this way:

"In addition to requiring a large amount of electricity during operation, the compressors in the gas diffusion facilities also generate a great deal of heat that requires dissipation. In U.S. plants this heat is dissipated through the use of ozone depleting chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) such as the coolant CFC-114 (often referred to simply as Freon or Freon-114). The manufacture, import, and use of CFCs were substantially restricted by the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, which the U.S. is implementing through the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act. As a result of these commitments, the manufacture of Freon in the U.S. ended in 1995 and its emissions to the air in the United States from large users fell by nearly 60% between 1991 and 2002. The emissions from the Paducah gaseous diffusion plant, however, have remained virtually constant over this time, falling just over 7% between 1989 and 2002. In 2002, the Paducah enrichment plant emitted more than 197.3 metric tons of Freon into the air through leaking pipes and other equipment. This single facility accounted for more than 55% of all airborne releases of this ozone depleting CFC from all large users in the entire United States in 2002. Due to the lack of additional manufacturing of Freon since 1995, the U.S. Enrichment Corporation [USEC] is currently looking for a non-CFC coolant to use. Likely candidates would still have heat trapping potential, and thus even if they were not as dangerous to the ozone layer, they would still remain a potential concern in relation to global warming and climate change."

-Arjun Makhijani, Ph.D., Lois Chalmers, Brice Smith, Ph.D. Uranium Enrichment: Just Plain Facts to Fuel an Informed Debate on Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Power. Institute for Energy and Environmental Research. October 2004. http://ieer.org/resource/reports/uranium-enrichment/

Since this time, USEC, the corporation that leases and operates the government-owned enrichment facility in Paducah, has not denied this history, but they claim to be moving toward a solution:

"Project sponsor USEC Inc. intends the American Centrifuge Plant to replace its existing energy-intensive, Cold-War era production facility. This transition will reduce greenhouse-gas emissions related to USEC’s existing enrichment technology by millions of tons annually."

The downside of this new, less energy-intensive technology is that once it is no longer exclusively possessed by one country, nuclear fuel enrichment becomes more small-scale and concealable. The US government and USEC have responded to public pressure to reduce the environmental impact of uranium enrichment, but they have very strong incentives to not share this technology. The benefit of the old technology is that it is so energy intensive and hot that facilities are difficult to hide from IAEA inspections. If the new technology were used by anyone other than its self-appointed guardians, uranium enrichment could become accessible to “rogue” states and non-state entities. If the new technology really does mitigate an old problem, it just creates a new one with equally unsettling implications.
However, the really unsettling thing about this issue is what it shows about our system of global governance. The UN proudly proclaims the following on its webpage entitled “ozone day”:

"In 1994, the United Nations General Assembly proclaimed 16 September the International Day for the Preservation of the Ozone Layer, commemorating the date of the signing, in 1987, of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (resolution 49/114). Implementation of the Montreal Protocol progressed well in developed and developing countries. All phase-out schedules were adhered to in most cases, some even ahead of schedule. In view of the steady progress made under the Protocol, already in 2003, former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated, ‘Perhaps the single most successful international agreement to date has been the Montreal Protocol’. His views are shared widely in the international community."

By the standards of all other international agreements, perhaps the Montreal Protocol is the most successful, but in light of what we know about the exemptions granted for uranium enrichment, it is clear that such agreements are made behind closed doors in an undemocratic process that leaves electorates and citizens uninformed about the issues in question. No one asked you if you thought the nuclear industry should be exempt from restrictions on CFC use, and the UN made no effort after the fact to inform you of its decision.
The decision to grant these exemptions must have been based on the “realism” that holds that nuclear disarmament is not going to happen and that the global investments made in nuclear power plants cannot just be written off in order to quickly halt destruction of the ozone layer.
No doubt, the UN must have turned to its own promoter of nuclear energy, the IAEA, to quantify the overall carbon and ozone impact of nuclear energy. Unsurprisingly, the IAEA would conclude that in spite of the negative effects of nuclear energy, the overall harm would be greater if the world had to produce electricity by other means.
Of course, opponents of nuclear do their own calculations and argue that nuclear energy has a much greater carbon footprint and ozone effect than the nuclear industry cares to admit. The negatives accumulate if one also considers the costs passed on to future generations for decommissioning, waste storage, decontamination and liability for accidents. The nuclear industry claims that money has been put aside for decommissioning and waste storage, but it is likely that the costs are going to be much higher than what has been put aside.
The public wasn't involved in this discussion at all when the Montreal Protocol was signed, although it is an interesting question to wonder what large environmental NGOs consented to and agreed not to discuss when compromises were worked out.
We can see in hindsight that the Montreal Protocol could have gone a lot further. It could have disallowed the exemptions for uranium enrichment and turned the world away from nuclear energy. It was, after all, just one year after the Chernobyl catastrophe. Now, twenty-five years later, when alternative energy sources are finally being developed on a large scale, it is clear that action should have been taken sooner. As much as the Montreal Protocol was a success in mitigating the worst damage to the ozone layer, it was a failure for continuing to support nuclear energy while missing an opportunity to promote alternatives.
We know about the exemptions for uranium enrichment only because of the relatively open nature of the United States government and the culture of citizen activism there. Argentina, Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Iran, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, and the United Kingdom are the other known operators of enrichment facilities, but nothing seems to be published about their impact on global warming and the ozone layer, or what these countries are planning to do to limit the environmental damage.

UPDATE MAY, 2013: For an update on USEC, see Ecowatch's Countdown to Nuclear Ruin at Paducah. The federal government privatized the enrichment plant many years ago, and now that USEC has made as much money as it can, it is abandoning the toxic legacy for tax payers to deal with.

Further reading and notes:

  • "The Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Paducah, Kentucky, is the only U.S.-owned uranium enrichment facility in the United States. Owned by the U.S. Department of Energy, it is leased and operated by the United States Enrichment Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of USEC Inc. The plant employs about 1,200 people and produces low-enriched uranium fuel for commercial nuclear power plants in the United States and around the world."
  • A good analysis of the claims made on both sides of the issue about of CFC use in uranium enrichment:
  • A response to anti-nuclear activist Helen Caldicott's “distortions,” apparently written by a loyal employee of USEC.
  • Understanding the Cleanup Process at Paducah’s Gaseous Diffusion Plant
  • A likely justification for allowing enrichment facilities to continue operations was so that they could afford to carry out downblending – the process of turning highly enriched uranium from decommissioned weapons into less enriched uranium for nuclear power plants. The existence of weapons grade uranium does not, however, mean that it must be used up in nuclear power plants if a nation has good reasons to produce its electricity by other means. Nuclear waste, regardless of its level of enrichment, can be disposed of in the same way that spent nuclear fuel is disposed of.
  • In the list above of other known operators of enrichment facilities, South Korea is not listed, even though it has adopted an energy policy of strong reliance on nuclear energy. It is curious that it would choose this policy while being utterly dependent on a foreign country continuing to operate enrichment facilities. This underlines the falsity of claims by some nations that they can achieve “energy independence” while becoming reliant on a form of energy that requires massive infrastructure investments, raw material imports, and other forms of energy for cooling and backup in case of accidents.
  • John Warrick. "Paducah Plant Spewed Plutonium." The Washington Post. October 1, 2000. "The unsigned maps, bearing a handwritten date of Aug. 26, 1999, show a plant ringed with contamination that extends in some cases for well over a mile. The diagrams also show elevated levels of plutonium in the Ohio River, about two miles north of the plant."
  • Jean Harrington. "Splitting the Atom." Scientific American. October 1939.
  • Pavel Podvig. "The Fallacy of the Megatons to Megawatts Program." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. July 23, 2008.
  • Geoffrey Sea, "Countdown to Nuclear Ruin at Paducah," Ecowatch, May 22, 2013.