2014/03/05

Radiation, let me compare thee

We know Japan has heightened levels of radiation, but what about those killer vending machines?
When I entered university, I quickly became aware that there were three types of people on campus: students in the humanities, others in commerce (the blanket term there for studies in economics, management  and finance), and the rest in engineering and sciences. At first, it seemed like a joke, like a contrived distinction on a school sports day when students are divided into red team, blue team and white team. But as time went on, I realized these were very serious and useful distinctions to last through a lifetime, perhaps even a very solid element of a theory of human nature. Thirty years later, the distinctions seem more pronounced than ever.
There are very few people who can live in more than one of these worlds, although the commerce and engineering types seem to move in each other’s world more easily. My university had a requirement that all undergraduates had to pass English 100 and at least one course in the sciences. This led to many strained relationships of convenience between people who couldn’t stand each other’s company. One would ask for help with an English paper in exchange for notes from a science course. Each would be embarrassed by his or her weakness, impatient with the other’s weakness, yet proud of his or her own strengths. And they hated each other’s world view. Usually, the relationships didn’t last long enough to make the study exchange bear any fruit.
These ancient animosities have been on my mind since I started writing about nuclear issues. I’ve encountered many defenses of the nuclear industry that remind me how difficult it is to exchange views with someone with a completely different set of cognitive skills who lives and works among like-minded people with shared interests. When we meet, we seem to each other like alien creatures speaking an unintelligible language. On a few occasions, I’ve come across arguments made by engineers that are pronounced with great confidence because they have been propped up within their insular world. As soon as they are uttered outside that world, the situation is just embarrassing because it is readily apparent that they are based on poor analogies, illogic and obliviousness to the wider questions beyond material utility–questions about morality, philosophy and creative ways to avoid ecological destruction.
One such example is the idea that the nuclear industry is moving toward perfection with each meltdown that provides valuable “lessons learned.” This idea of the perfectibility of the technology is enough to make me wonder if I’m not the one who is being quixotic. The nuclear lobby thinks of themselves as conservative, hard-nosed realists. They say, "You can’t put the genie back in the bottle. This is the reality. Deal with it. Don’t be a quixotic fool dreaming about a nuclear-free world." But when it comes to the record of nuclear disasters, they are suddenly utopian dreamers ready to spout about the perfectibility of man.
It was put to me once that nuclear perfection will be just like the history of boiler accidents. Once, when boiler technology was new, there were many accidents and many deaths, but now there are few because of better regulation and designs. Actually, Wikipedia lists about forty famous boiler accidents, and they seem to still be occurring in recent history. But in any case, the important thing is that we’ve all forgotten about the boiler disasters of the past because they aren’t surrounded by massive sacrifice zones where no one can live or cultivate the land. The broken boilers didn’t leave a molten core of radioactive waste leaking into the groundwater for centuries to come. The ruins of boilers were cleaned up quickly because the site was not too radioactive for humans to work in. Clearing up the site didn’t take four decades and 100 billion dollars. Boiler disasters were not low-consequence events for the people who died in them, but they were low-impact in terms of their broader effects. There is just no basis here for a comparison with the meltdown of a nuclear reactor.
Another strange argument I’ve heard is that the nuclear industry is unfairly targeted for regulation, and provokes too much irrational public anxiety. Risk is everywhere, so another argument suggested that hamburger restaurants should be regulated so that cholesterol consumption is reduced to the lowest possible level that is known to cause no harm. It’s surprising to me that the highly trained scientists and engineers who run the nuclear industry can actually be proud of such arguments. When I was younger, I sort of admired the people who could pass advanced calculus and physics courses, but now I wonder if this talent comes at the expense of other faculties of reasoning.
It seems to me that it shouldn’t be necessary to explain to a nuclear engineer the difference between cholesterol and anthropogenic radionuclides. The former is an organic molecule that has been part of the human diet since before we evolved into humans. It has benefits in itself, and delivers more benefits because of the protein and other nutrients that come with it in many foods. We have ways of sensing when we’ve had too much, we know when we are eating it, and we can freely choose to have more or less of it. None of these things is true of anthropogenic radionuclides. They’ve been in our food and water for only a few decades, and the decision to put them there came without the consent of the victim. They have no role in organic chemistry, and no benefits to offer in living organisms. They are poisons. We have no way to sense when we have been exposed to them, and thus no way to avoid them. To protect ourselves from them, we must rely on experts whose function it is to promote the nuclear industry, not to protect individual health. When a nuclear expert argues that the nuclear industry is unfairly targeted and regulated, he is showing that he doesn’t understand what it is about the field he works in that makes it uniquely hazardous and fully deserving of public oversight and skepticism.
I encountered the first two examples in private conversations. The next one comes from the book The Highway of the Atom, by Peter Van Wyck. He critiqued the Government of Canada study that whitewashed the radioactive contamination of the Dene people on Great Bear Lake (which is another story covered in more detail here). The lead fact-finder of the study, Walter Keyes, is vocally pro-nuclear and generally opposed to regulation. He worked for the firm Intertec Management Limited which was contracted to conduct the study. He was also a former deputy minister in the Saskatchewan government (which promotes uranium mining in the province) and he belongs to the lobby group Canadian Nuclear Association. Van Wyck discovered a publication in which Keyes seems to be seriously complaining that vending machines deserve to be more regulated and publicly feared than the nuclear industry because they have caused several deaths over the years (because once in a while angry customers shake them until they topple over), whereas nuclear power plants caused none. Van Wyck cites these words that Keyes spoke to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency:

Although there have been no recorded deaths in North America from radiation exposures at either uranium mines or nuclear power facilities during the past 30 years, there have been enormous sums of money spent on regulation, inspection and enforcement. Yet, in contrast there have been 30 reported deaths in North America from vending machines during the past 20 years–and that’s from the machines themselves, without looking at what may be the hazardous contents of the machines such as cigarettes, food products and other items. Does this mean that government is over-regulating the nuclear industry or under-regulating the vending industry? Is this a case where the cumulative impact on the environment and public safety of vending machines has been overlooked because each incremental item is seen as being so very small without fully understanding the overall impacts? (1)(2)
We can leave aside the fact that Keyes sets the parameters narrowly as deaths by radiation on site. There is plenty of evidence suggesting that the nuclear industry has slowly killed many people offsite. Of more concern is that a lead investigator in a study on the health effects of radiation disingenuously tries here to deny the potential of the nuclear industry to cause disasters of wide-scale consequence. He pretends not to understand what it is about nuclear technology that makes the public want to have it more strictly controlled than vending machine technology.
The three arguments discussed here are just some examples of how the nuclear lobby develop these non sequiturs among themselves and become laughably over-confident in their ability to present convincing arguments to the public. One would think that people so well trained in the sciences would be more skilled in logical rhetoric. In fact, I think they would be capable of better rhetoric if there were indeed any good arguments to be made. Lacking them, all they can do is make very weak analogies to boilers, hamburgers and vending machines.
So let me offer a suggestion. Forget the analogies. There is nothing else like nuclear physics, even though it does provide some powerful metaphors for many abstract phenomena. I would give the same advice to anti-nuclear people. You can compare radioactive contamination to assault on the integrity of the body, but the analogy only goes so far. Direct violence (person on person) is illegal, but the same cannot be said of the activities of the nuclear industry. Its activities are licensed and its accidents do not result in criminal prosecution.
Strangely enough, radiation can be the source of a metaphor, but not the target. Meaning is very effectively conveyed when we talk about a policy that is too radioactive for the president to mention, or when we warn about a financial meltdown, but it’s senseless to say, “Stay away from that nuclear reactor. It’ll get you like a vending machine.” As a rhetorical device, this is cheap sarcasm, I know. But seriously, there is nothing else like radiation. I suspect that the reason is that metaphors are drawn from the natural world, what the human mind understands instinctively from its long evolution. We can easily conceive of birth as arrival and death as departure, but what is beta decay? Until the 20th century, radiation was irrelevant to life, and it is still outside of sensory experience, so there is no way to make it the target of an insightful, interesting metaphor.

(1)
Walter Keyes and Dennis Lawson. Presentation to Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency. Saskatoon, February 29, 2000, on behalf of the Risk Assessment Society. Cited in: Peter C. Van Wyck. The Highway of the Atom (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010). Pages 186-187.
(2)
United States Consumer Product Safety Commission. CPSC, Soda Vending Machine Industry Labeling Campaign Warns Of Deaths And Injuries. November 2, 1995.

2014/02/23

The Hibakusha who Apologized for Hiroshima and Nagasaki

In the summer of 1998, representatives of the Dene people of Great Bear Lake went to Hiroshima to express their remorse for having hauled ore from the Port Radium mine to supply fuel for the atomic bombs dropped on Japan. They had no foreknowledge of what they were participating in, and they suffered horribly afterwards from the effects of radiation, but still they felt responsible.
Until the 1990s, because of their isolation and neglect by the Canadian government, they had little understanding of where those “money rocks” had gone, and little awareness of the rocks’ connection to numerous deaths among them from strange new illnesses. But then journalists, academics and filmmakers began to appear with questions about the past and information about the causes of those illnesses. The Dene were dismayed by the neglect they had suffered, but were equally burdened by the new awareness of what they had helped to bring upon Japanese people. Their sense of responsibility knew nothing of the civilized impulse toward self-exculpation. They felt responsible for not having asked questions about what they had agreed to work on, for not having made every effort to understand the implications of their participation. That’s an ethical standard that few people could live up to.
In 1998, Canadian journalists shed light on the story of the Port Radium mine, and in 1999 the documentary film Village of Widows covered the story and the trip by the Dene to Japan. Peter van Wyck returned to it more recently in his book Highway of the Atom (2010). Nonetheless, the story is forgotten (or never-known) history for most Canadians. When a nuclear-powered Soviet satellite crashed over the Northwest Territories in 1978, widely dispersing radioactive waste in the region, it was an irony lost on everyone.
The most interesting twist in the story is that in 2005-06, during the peak of the so-called “nuclear renaissance,” a film director, David Henningson, headed up to Great Bear Lake to make a film called Somba ke: The Money Place about the relations between the Dene and Hiroshima and Nagasaki (watch it on youtube here). During preparations he found that attitudes had shifted, and he ended up making a film very different from the one he had set out to make. The Dene were now reluctant to speak of the past because a mining company called Alberta Star had concluded an agreement with them to reopen the mine. Canadian author Douglas Coupland was a major shareholder, along with his brother, the CEO. This time, of course, the Dene were promised that things would be different. The next year, in 2008, the Deline Land Corporation (Dene controlled) announced they would oppose all future uranium development until remaining issues with the old Port Radium mine were resolved. Alberta Star's stock was $3 in the days of the "nuclear renaissance," but today (Feb. 23, 2014) in the post-Fukushima world, it trades at $0.21. 
   At other active uranium mine sites in Northern Canada, aboriginal communities are divided on their support for nuclear energy(1), but for the most part they have made peace with the atom and are working for and with uranium mining companies. As far as I know, none of them have offered apologies for Fukushima Daiichi.
   The article below gives a good overview of the history of Port Radium from the 1930s to 1990s. It no longer exists on the Calgary Herald website, though the journalist who wrote it, Andrew Nikiforuk, has been active since, covering the Alberta Tar Sands and the energy crisis. A few versions of this article are posted on web pages that seem to have not been attended to since the 1990s. I’ve tried to restore it to a readable version that does not have each sentence and quotation formatted as a separate paragraph.

(1) Andrew Loewen. "Legal action seeks transparency from Northern Village of Pinehouse regarding uranium contracts." Briarpatch Magazine. January 27, 2014.
http://briarpatchmagazine.com/announcements/view/legal-action-pinehouse
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Echoes of the Atomic Age: Cancer kills fourteen aboriginal uranium workers
by Andrew Nikiforuk
Calgary Herald, Alberta, Canada
originally published on Saturday, March 14, 1998

At the dawn of the nuclear age, Paul Baton and more than 30 Dene hunters and trappers innocently called uranium “the money rock.” Paid $3 a day by their white employers, the Dene hauled and ferried burlap sacks of the grimy ore from the world’s first uranium mine at Port Radium, across the Northwest Territories to Fort McMurray. Since then, at least 14 Dene who worked at the mine between 1942 and 1960 have died of lung, colon and kidney cancers, according to documents obtained through the N.W.T. Cancer Registry.
The Port Radium mine supplied the uranium to fuel the $2-billion effort to make the first atomic bombs. “Before the mine, you never heard of cancer,” said Baton, 83. “Now, lots of people have died of cancer.” Charged Cindy Gilday, chairwoman of the Deline’s Uranium Committee: “In my mind it’s a war crime that has been well hidden. The Dene were the first civilian victims of the war and are the last to be addressed.”
The Dene, who say they were never told of uranium’s hazards, will decide next weekend whether to sue or seek a settlement with the federal government. Declassified U.S. documents show that the U.S. government, which was the buyer, and Ottawa, then the world’s largest supplier, withheld health and safety information from miners, as well as natives.
Robie Chatterjee, head of health physics and risk with the Atomic Energy Control Board, responded to the news of the high incidence of cancers among the Dene by saying: “We were not aware of this (the cancers). It definitely deserves more investigation.”
The federal government owned Eldorado Mining and Refining and regulated the uranium industry. It privatized the firm in 1988.
During the mine’s heyday in the 1950s, many Dene slept on the ore, ate fish from water contaminated by radioactive tailings and breathed radioactive dust while on the barges, docks and portages. More than a dozen men carried sacks of ore weighing more than 45 kilograms for 12 hours a day, six days a week, four months a year. “That might be comparable to taking a chest X-ray every week for a year with an old machine,” said Dr. David Bates, an environmental health analyst and chair of British Columbia’s royal commission on uranium in 1980.
“The people at the time didn’t speak English,” said Shirley Baton-Modest, 33, a Deline resident. “I think my people were used as guinea-pigs. They were never informed of the dangers.” A 1991 federal aboriginal health survey found the Deline community reporting twice as much illness as any other Canadian aboriginal community. But the federal government has never studied the Dene’s health-related concerns -- specifically cancer.
André Corriveau, the Northwest Territories’ chief medical officer of health, noted that high cancer rates among the Dene don’t differ significantly from the overall territorial profile. However, the death rate is skewed by high rates of smoking among the Inuit, he said.
Andy Orkin, an Ontario lawyer who deals with aboriginal and environmental issues, will present a brief to the Dene next week. “We left them to die and hoped they would never ask any questions,” he said.
Fourteen of the 30 Dene who worked at the Port Radium, N.W.T. uranium mine have died of cancer. Declassified documents on the U.S. atomic weapons and energy program reveal that both the Canadian and American governments knew in the early 1940s of the deadly hazards of uranium extraction. Yet for two decades Ottawa failed to warn thousands of miners and natives of the risks they faced daily. Now, the elders of Deline must decide whether to seek a settlement -- or sue for compensation.
Just south of the Arctic Circle on the shores of Great Bear Lake, the surviving elders of Deline now say the Prophet warned them. These are the people whose dead husbands and brothers hauled the raw uranium ore that helped make the bombs that obliterated Hiroshima and Nagasaki; the ones who still have no word for radiation.
In immaculate white-walled bungalows, the elders nod at a stark photograph of a bearded figure and say in hushed and saddened tones, “Yes, Grandfather told us.” Until his death in 1940, Louis Ayah, one of the North’s great aboriginal seers, repeatedly warned his people that the waters in Great Bear Lake would turn a foul yellow. According to “Grandfather,” the yellow poison would flow toward the village, recalls Madelaine Bayha, one of a dozen scarfed and skirted “uranium widows” in the village. “The prophet spoke about that poison. He said that there would be sickness and that people would go through hard times and that there would be deaths,” says Bayha, 82. Her husband, Joseph, worked for years at the uranium mine and died as many white miners did: coughing himself to death.
Fifty years after the first atomic bomb, the Cold War and the economic boom that was uranium, the elders in this community of 600 people are beginning to understand the meaning of that disturbing vision. They realize that the ore mined from their ancestral hunting grounds became the ingredient of mass destruction; that the poison was none other than radiation and its deadly progeny; and that the source was Port Radium, the world’s first uranium mine -- a primitive and often secret Crown company called Eldorado Mining and Refining, run by the federal government from 1942 to 1960.
They also suspect that many of the 18 deaths caused by cancer or lung diseases in the community in the past 30 years may be all part of the forgotten mine’s radioactive legacy and that of its transport arm, Northern Transportation Co. Ltd. And they have many questions. Why did the federal government, their guardian, and Eldorado, a defunct Crown corporation, never tell them of the dangers of uranium mining? Why, in a community where cancers were unknown and elders once lived into their 90s, have so many men died in their 60s and 70s?
“Something’s wrong. A lot of people have died of cancer in the last 15 years,” says Paul Baton, 83. As a young man he and more than 30 other Dene men barged or hauled 100-pound bags of uranium ore concentrate along a 2,100-kilometre transportation web of rivers, rapids and portages known as the “Highway of the Atom.” In addition to serving as coolies for the war effort, the Dene ate fish from contaminated dredging ponds. Their children played with the dusty ore at river docks and portage landings. And their women sewed tents from used uranium sacks.
The boatmen often slept atop ore-filled barges and nearly a dozen families regularly hunted, camped and fished at areas that a federal government study on radioactive wastes identified in 1994 as having “elevated gamma radiation, due to spillage of uranium ore.”
“Before the mine, you never heard of cancer,” says Baton, a small man with clear eyes and a strong face. “Not once. . . . The river pilots I knew all died of cancer. The families that cut logs for the mine are all gone. Something is wrong.”
Although proving that a specific radioactive dose caused a specific individual cancer is problematic, scientists generally agree that there is no safe threshold for radiation exposure. All exposures carry some risk of cancer or genetic effects and there is no doubt that the many Dene were routinely exposed to gamma radiation and radioactive dust over a period of 20 years.
The first Dene to die of cancer, or what elders still call “the incurable disease,” was Old Man Ferdinand in 1960. He had worked at the mine site as a logger, guide and stevedore for nearly a decade. “It was Christmastime and he wanted to shake hands with all the people as they came back from hunting,” recalls Rene Fumoleau, then an Oblate missionary working in Deline. After saying goodbye to the last family that came in, Ferdinand declared: “‘Well, I guess I shook hands with everyone now,’ and he died three hours later.”
Others followed in the next decade. Victor Dolphus’ arm came off when he tried to start an outboard motor. Dolphus, who had worked at the mine site for years, needed a contraption to hold up his neck before the cancer finished him. Joe Kenny, a boat pilot, died of colon cancer. His son, Napoleon, a deck hand, died of stomach cancer. And so on. The premature death of so many men has not only left many widows but interrupted the handing down of culture. “In Dene society it is the grandfather who passes on the traditions and now there are too many men with no uncles, fathers or grandfathers to advise them,” says Cindy Gilday, Joe Kenny’s daughter, and chair of Deline Uranium Committee. “It’s the most vicious example of cultural genocide I have ever seen and it’s in my own home.”
Although the Atomic Energy Control Board and uranium companies have long argued that little was known about uranium’s hazards, evidence from U.S. and Canadian archives and survivors of the era tell a different story.
Unlike Ottawa, the U.S. recently declassified 250,000 documents on its atomic weapons and energy program, which reveal that government officials and scientists in both countries actively discussed uranium’s hazards in secret. Yet publicly they remained mute. The perils were well documented. As early as 1932, Canada’s Department of Mines published studies on Port Radium that repeatedly warned about radon’s poisonous effects on the lungs and “dangers from inhalation of radioactive dust.” The department’s own blood studies on Port Radium miners lead it to conclude “that a hazard may exist in the breathing of air containing even small amounts of radon.”
Wilhelm C. Hueper also knew this. In 1942 the founding director of the environmental cancer section of the U.S. National Cancer Institute reviewed 300 years of radon data on European miners. His conclusion: radon gas in cobalt mines routinely produced lung cancers that systematically killed more than half of all miners 10 to 20 years after their employment.
Hueper predicted a similar tragedy for radium miners in Great Bear Lake and the Belgium Congo. Warned the scientist: “In case the Belgian and Canadian operations should be conducted without the essential and comprehensive protective measures for the workers, the prospects for an epidemic-like appearance of lung carcinomas among their employees can be anticipated in the not too distant future.” Forty years later, two Canadian mortality studies confirmed Hueper’s foresight.
When Hueper began to issue similar warnings to U.S. uranium miners on the Colorado Plateau in the early 1950s, “the mine operators and politicians got all excited,” says Victor E. Archer, an epidemiologist who started the first cancer studies on U.S. miners in 1954 and is now a professor of occupational medicine in Salt Lake City at the University of Utah. Declassified U.S. documents also show that the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission told Hueper, a world expert on lung cancers, that references to occupational cancers among uranium miners were “not in the public interest” and “represented mere conjecture.”
Notes Archer: “The Canadians knew about the same things that the U.S. did and in general tagged along with the Atomic Energy Commission.” In fact Eldorado management and the Canadian government regularly received updates on radon and lung cancer studies on American uranium miners throughout the 1950s. But neither government nor mine owners wanted to scare miners away or implement better health safeguards that would force uranium prices up, says Archer.
“We always suspected that the Americans had more information about the hazards but we could never get the damn stuff,” recalls Hank Bloy, a retired engineer for Eldorado’s Port Radium and Beaverlodge mines in the late 1950s. “The Americans were buying our uranium and wanted it badly and didn’t cooperate too much on the health standards.”
In 1945, a federal research team from Montreal sent to monitor radon in the mine found conditions at Port Radium appalling. They reported that “the radon content seems to be so high as to be definitely dangerous to the health of those working in the mines.” Despite the installation of some fans in 1946, concerns about protection for miners at Great Bear Lake even became the subject of several 1949 memos at the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, which at that time bought all the mine’s ore. This information was so confidential that one memo said: “It should not be quoted in any published report.”
The next reference to ongoing radiation hazards at the mine surfaced at a secret 1953 meeting at Chalk River, Ont. When Canadian officials expressed concerns about high radon concentration in uranium mines, their American counterparts replied that “our problem is different because we have no concentration of uranium of any magnitude.” This was a lie: By 1953, the U.S. Public Health Services had established that American miners on the Colorado Plateau were being exposed to the same radiation doses as Hueper’s European miners.
Dr. André Cipriani, a Canadian biologist keenly concerned about health safety in the whole uranium industry, then reported “that there had been three or four cases of cancers in employees” at Port Radium. When the Canadian government finally sent two physicists to the area in the mid-1950s to check on radon levels at Port Radium’s sister mine on Lake Athabasca -- a mine with much lower grade ore -- they found lots of radon. But according to one retired senior civil servant, that report, like Hueper’s concerns, never saw the light of day. “We printed it in green covers, which means declassified, and sent a copy up to Chalk River. And the next thing I knew we got orders from the assistant deputy minister to collect every copy and get them back to the department because not one was to go out. That report was squashed. “I know that Eldorado was extremely cautious and didn’t want anything coming out and I guess they said, ‘For God’s sake, stop this!’ and it never came out,” says the pensioned official, who is still bound to silence by the Official Secrets Act.
Because this health information was withheld, Canada’s energy minister, Gordon Churchill, was able to declare in 1959 “that there are no special hazards attached to the mining of uranium that differ from other mining activities.” Notes Robert Bothwell, a University of Toronto historian and author of Eldorado, a lengthy history of the Crown company: “The profound and deliberate falsification of nuclear hazards began at the top.”
The Port Radium record was eventually repeated at uranium mines across Canada. When the Ontario government appointed James Ham to study mine safety at Elliot Lake, another Eldorado uranium property, in 1974, he concluded that “neither the workers nor their representatives were advised about the emerging status of the problem of lung cancer.” Although Elliot Lake has now been closed for nearly 10 years, former miners with lung cancer and other radiation related ailments make an average of one compensation claim a week in Ontario.
The Atomic Energy Commission still has not adopted the latest radiation exposure guidelines issued by the International Commission of Radiation Protection. The ICRP, based in Sweden, issued the recommended levels in 1991.
Later Canadian studies found just what scientists early on had predicted would be found. One pilot study on Port Radium found 10 cases of lung cancer among 76 men who had worked more than five years at the mine. They died between 1953 and 1975. Ontario and Newfoundland studies found miners exposed to radon had three to five times the average lung cancer rate. And on it went.
Watching a uranium miner die of a radioactive damaged lung is a job only for the brave. Al King, an 82-year-old retired member of the Steelworkers union in Vancouver, has held the hands of the dying. He recalls one retired Port Radium miner whose chest lesions were so bad that they had spread to his femur and exploded it. “They couldn’t pump enough morphine into him to keep him from screaming before he died.”
“The ethical issues raised by this case are profound,” says Andy Orkin, a well-known Ontario lawyer who advises the community and also represents the Cree of northern Quebec. “We did it to them. Somebody knew the stuff was dangerous. Even by standards of the day, they had a right to know.”
Before the mine, the Dene, a nomadic people, hunted and fished along the rocky shores of Great Bear, the world’s fourth-largest and least-studied inland lake. But the stability of that caribou life changed when the Dene unwittingly met the atom in 1930. That’s the year Gilbert and Charlie LaBine started to mine a rich load of pitchblende or radium just an eight-hour boat ride north of Deline (then Fort Franklin). According to the elders, a Dene hunter traded a sample of the black lustrous mineral to a Kentucky-born fur trapper, who then alerted the LaBines, failed gold-seekers. In exchange for the right to mine an ore then worth more than $70,000 a gram on world markets, the Dene received a few sacks of flour, lard and baking powder. “On that day, the babies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were doomed to death by the time they would become 15 years of age,” noted a 1945 Herald article on the historic mine.
Radium, which consists largely of uranium oxides, was then used for watch dials, medical X-rays and cancer treatments. It is just one of the radioactive byproducts of uranium, a constantly decaying metal that releases a wide spectrum of deadly energy particles, much like shrapnel from a grenade. Port Radium contained so much of its namesake that in 1932 the Herald hailed the find as a “treasure house” and “Great Bear’s rich citadel.” As a consequence, the mine immediately broke the world monopoly on radium held by a Belgium firm in the Congo.
Rather than ship tonnes of chemicals to Great Bear to refine the radium, Eldorado established a refinery in Port Hope, Ontario. It sold uranium as a waste product for $1.35 a pound or scattered radioactive tailings around the city -- a source of later scandals. Before the mine temporarily closed in 1940 due to the war and declining radium demand, the Dene supplied caribou meat for the miners and then worked as loggers, stevedores or radium coolies.
In 1942, the U.S. Manhattan Project -- the secret effort to turn split atoms into explosive bombs -- quickly revived the mine’s fortunes. Having no uranium sources of its own, the American government rapidly bought Port Radium stockpiles at the Port Hope Refinery and placed an order for 60 tonnes of uranium oxide. To advance the war effort, Ottawa secretly purchased the mine. Alberta’s wide-open spaces were even offered as possible test sites for the bomb.
It’s unknown how many tonnes of Port Radium ore fuelled the first test bomb, called “Trinity,” or even the war-stoppers -- “Fat Man” and “Little Boy.” A shipload of Congo ore sitting in New York harbor eventually made up the bulk of the supplies because Eldorado had trouble filling both American and British orders for the war effort. But the Manhattan Project mixed ores from Great Bear and Africa and all the uranium was refined at Port Hope.
“Nobody knew what was going on,” recalls Isadore Yukon, who hauled ores for three summers in a row during the 1940s. “Keeping the mine going full blast was the important thing.” To that end, the mine employed 250 white miners who battled frigid waters, poor ventilation (the mine counted on natural drafts to circulate air) and Port Radium’s remoteness. Miner turnover was high. While the whites mined the ore and sewed crushed ores into sacks, the Dene carried and piloted what they called the “money rock” out of Great Bear to Fort McMurray.
“When I was young,” recalled 66-year-old Alfred Taniton, who worked on the ore-ferrying boats for five years, “I saw some of the workers hauling ores. The whites would have showers but us native people didn’t. I guess they really wanted to destroy us... That’s why they never told us these things.”
His wife Jane, now 59, lived two years at the mine and ate herring from the dredging pond. Two years ago she had a cancerous kidney removed. “If they had told us the truth the people wouldn’t have worked for them,” adds Alfred.
In 1994, an advisory committee to President Bill Clinton published a study on “human radiation experiments” in the United States. It looked at the treatment of miners, many of whom were Navajos. Based on declassified documents, it concluded that “an insufficient effort was made by the federal government to mitigate the hazard to uranium miners through early ventilation of the mines and that as a result miners died… Because the federal government did not take the necessary action, the product it purchased was at the price of hundreds of deaths.” That summary should bring no comfort to Deline’s widows, nor to the widows of hundreds of uranium miners across Canada. But it explains a legacy of deception.
“Of all the world’s nuclear powers, Canada is the last hold-out on talking about its nuclear legacy and how so many things went terribly wrong,” says Gordon Edwards, a Montreal mathematician and president of the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility. “I could never understand why authorities were so resistant,” reflects Archer, whose epidemiology studies on American miners finally broke the official silence in 1961. “As I got older I saw the same thing with cigarette smoking and asbestos. I now believe that it’s a cultural thing. People are reluctant to change their minds and accept new ideas.”
“The first time I heard about this bomb was from an army veteran in the 1950s,” says Deline elder Paul Baton. “The soldier said he’d had respiratory problems, probably due to the war. He told us about the bomb and the aftermath and what it was made from. “He explained how they dropped the bomb and its effect on the Japanese. He said later, down the years, it will affect my land and my life… “We had no idea. We are a strong people. We stand by our words. The elders are worried about the water, the air and the land. We must keep it clean because other animals use the land… I have never talked about this before but now I am talking.”
In Deline, the elders -- the ones that survived their introduction to the nuclear age -- now go to the restored house of the prophet, the Grandfather, to speak to the dead. There are not many other grandfathers left.

Port Radium (Eldorado) Timeline

1932: Port Radium begins production. Mines Canada issues health warnings on radon gas and radioactive dust.
1939: Canadian ore used in first atomic chain reaction experiment.
1940: Port Radium closes.
1941: Port Radium reopens for war effort, as world’s first uranium mine.
1942: United States government orders 60 tonnes of uranium. Canadian government secretly begins to buy out mine. Dene work as coolies.
1945: Bombs dropped on Japan.
1949: U.S. officials raise health concerns about Port Radium miners.
1953: First Port Radium miner dies of cancer. United States government secretly begins health studies on U.S. miners.
1956: Value of uranium production hits $1 billion in Canada.
1957: Elliot Lake mine opens.
1960: Port Radium mine closes. No uranium left. First Dene dies of cancer.
1967: First radon standards set.
1974: First uranium miners with lung cancer compensated by Ontario.
1976: Ham Royal Commission slams government for hiding health information from miners. First Ontario studies published.
1979: First cancer death study on Port Radium miners.
1988: Canadian government merges Eldorado with the Sasktachewan Mining Development Corporation to form Cameco.







2014/02/20

L'état, c'est MOX

Nuclear waste disposal is the Achilles' heel of the nuclear industry. It can continue only if the public is convinced that a long-term burial solution is possible. However, the interview with Jean-Pierre Petit (translation below) illustrates that the public is being deceived on this point. Powerful nations that cling to their nuclear arsenals and fleets of nuclear power stations are now slaves to the dictatorship of the plutonium economy. Thus the title that refers to the Mixed OXide fuel of uranium and plutonium that the industry is hellbent on using in its reactors. 

L'état, c'est MOX
   
   In February, 2014, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico, the American site for burial of military nuclear waste, suffered a radiological emergency that required the evacuation of the facility. The site is too radioactive to enter, and managers, if they know what happened down in the tunnels, are saying little to the public. Shortly before the incident, a truck caught fire in one of the tunnels at the site, but the two events appear to be not related.
These accidents have highlighted exactly what critics have always warned about. The viability of the nuclear industry depends on having such final disposal sites, but they are unproven and vulnerable to accidents such as the ones that happened within a single month at one facility, only fifteen years after it opened.
Critics have warned that disposal containers are likely to corrode, moisture can leak into the site, the ground can shift, or heat can build up and cause fires, explosions or create weaknesses in the containers and support structures. Underground disposal is supposed to be the “walk-away-safe” solution that will give nuclear energy the freedom to expand over the next century as the sensible response to global warming, but the accident at WIPP is more evidence that this solution isn’t a solution at all. The term “passive safety” refers more appropriately to a passive public that has been instilled with illusions of safety.
A critic of the WIPP facility, Don Hancock, was in Toronto in 2013 advising local activists who are opposed to Ontario Power Generation’s plan to build a nuclear waste disposal site on the shores of Lake Huron. He pointed out that OPG looked to WIPP as an example of “industry best practices.” He explained then the known shortcomings of the site, and low and behold, a few months later, the scenario that critics conceived of came to pass. There was an "excursion of material" in the hole, and now the site is too radioactive to work in. The problem might get resolved, but over a year later things are not going well and the future viability of the site is in doubt. The incident underscored the possibility of catastrophes occurring at nuclear waste sites. They won’t keep the wastes safely isolated from the ecosystem for thousands of years, and they may not stay safe long enough for them to even to be loaded to their designated capacity.
The nuclear waste problem is the biggest obstacle faced by the nuclear industry, perhaps bigger than costs and the public’s fear of accidents. Promoters of nuclear would rather the public not think about it. The Japanese government has lately spoken about finally taking action on the problem, but they prefer to be utterly deceptive about the problems involved. They believe it is urgent to have this “cheap” form of energy so that they can compete with countries like South Korea, which supposedly has “cheap” nuclear energy costs. But South Korea too is equally deluded about nuclear waste solutions available to such a small nation. It’s as if both nations want to compete in a race in which there will be no winners.
Coincidentally, just before the accident at WIPP, Sputnik's French language channel interviewed a prestigious French scientist on what he sees as the dangerous and absurd plans France is following in order to perpetuate its nuclear industry. The astrophysicist Jean-Pierre Petit is the former director of Le Centre national de la recherche scientifique, and he is obviously not an antinuclear activist the nucleocracy could scornfully dismiss (as they have been known to do) as "just a language teacher" or a "just a housewife" driven by irrational fear and ignorance. He knows of what he speaks.
The passage below contains a condensed translation of the two-part interview on Sputnik. The questions have been omitted and a few sections in square brackets [ ] have been added to supply the context that was given by the questions in the original.
The original French transcripts are here: Part1 and Part2. I recommend looking at the original source, even if you can’t read French, in order to see the illustrations and graphs that go with the interview.




There is one thing that has ruled in the world since the dawn of time, and that is the formidable mix of greed and stupidity. My personal view is that, for a long time, there has been only 5% of the population who are capable of thinking for themselves, capable of reflecting, and thinking critically, with autonomous moral evaluation based on reason. To them we can add 20% who lack conscience or awareness, who are devoured by their egoism, their ambition and their fear. Thus, someone who belongs to this group feels that pursuing power is a question of survival, for himself and his relations, for his ethnic group, his country, for his position that, in his eyes, confers all rights.
[The remaining 75% of people] can be manipulated toward any end. They can be put to sleep, made afraid, subjugated, turned against other groups or against each other, on a small or large scale. They can be impoverished to extreme levels before they will revolt. In France, a comical drawing has appeared of a new creature created from genetic recombination, what is called a pigeton [half pigeon, half mouton, or sheep]. This animal swallows anything and allows itself to be sheared without protest. They behave collectively, in the millions, and can follow any leader, no matter how irrational he may be.
At this moment, the nuclear technocrats are pushing strongly a project called CIGEO (Centre Industriel de Stockage Géologique) which involves burying high-level nuclear waste in Bure, in the east of France, in the place famous throughout the world for producing champagne. There is already a pilot project there five hundred meters deep in a layer of clay that is one hundred meters thick. There are tunnels there where the state plans to bury the million tons of high-level waste produced by the nuclear industry over the last half-century.
The time span over which the wastes need to be stored is immeasurably longer than the duration of the metal containers that will hold the wastes. They will corrode within a few decades. This goes for the concrete containers as well which won’t last longer than a century.
Assurance is given by experts, the same experts who planned the storage of nuclear wastes in a German salt mine in Asse. They said it was absolutely sure to be a permanent solution “on the scale of geological time.” In France, the nuclear waste project arises from a law passed by a representative from Nord Pas de Calais, Christian Bataille (in office from 1991-2006). He approved, without reservations, the positive conclusions of experts on the Bure disposal plan. This was exactly how he approved the German project in Asse, also in total agreement with experts then. Bataille has what you could call “the hamster complex.” He loves to dig.
In Asse, Germany, the experts assumed the salt deposit was homogenous and stable. They simply forgot that in a mine, half the volume that has to be considered is made up of what you have put in the tunnels and caverns. Salt is hygroscopic. It absorbs water. The experts thought that salt would be an ideal barrier, but it didn’t turn out that way.
It was only a matter of decades before the operation turned into a nightmare. In certain parts of the mine, the movement was ten centimeters per year, so imagine the result after thousands of years. What a great gift for the next 6,000 generations of humans. Water that comes into the site can just as easily flow out later with radioactive particles in it. It can go anywhere into the water table and enter the food chain. There would be no way to stop it.
In Asse, water has entered and covered thousands of waste containers, and they have become unrecoverable. They have to recover the 126,000 containers that are in there. The cost would be enormous, but something has to be done before the pollution spreads to underground water sources in the region.
Nuclear power buys local communities, and the money flows freely. Opponents with technical competence are pressured into silence. To be free, you have to be retired. If not, all forms of pressure are possible.
Billions of euros have been spent just getting to the stage where tests can be conducted. But the storage of wastes with long half-lives poses acute problems. In general, there are two sorts of wastes. There are those that can be called “passive,” like asbestos, and those that can be called “active” that evolve chemically, decompose, and eventually produce flammable gas, and heat. Nuclear wastes obviously belong in the second “active” category. They release heat by their  exo-energetic transmutation. So storage sites require powerful ventilation systems that need to be maintained for centuries. Some wastes that are plastic decompose relatively quickly, releasing hydrogen. When the air reaches 4% hydrogen, it becomes explosive.
In the year 2000, they began to store various types of waste, one of which was mercury, underground at a mine in Alsace. In 2002, a fire broke out. They wanted to get everything out, but they realized it could never be recovered… A fire in a mine is more complicated to manage than a fire above ground. It’s like an oven. The heat has no way out. A small fire can quickly result in elevated temperatures at which the containers begin to melt.
In Bure, a fire would be catastrophic. The wastes are vitrified (in a glass-like state), but glass is not really a solid. It’s a very viscuous fluid. At ordinary temperatures, it can do the job for thousands of years. It is not soluble. But the weak point of glass is its low resistance to heat. At 600°C, the glass will flow and liberate its contents. Underground, this temperature could be reached very quickly. In the mine there are also support structures made of metal and reinforced concrete.  Concrete melts above 1100°. The clay in Bure is also saturated with water. It couldn’t withstand being heated above 70°. The creators of the CIGEO project have great faith in a material called bentonite with which they hope to seal the caverns. It’s a particular type of clay that can absorb water and dilate, but it has the same problem as clay in terms of heat resistance.
Fire hazards come not only from the concern about hydrogen explosions. The plan at Bure is to deposit some elements treated with bitumen, but bitumen becomes fluid at 60° and flammable at 300°. Any way you look at it, this project is absurd.
The only thing to do now is to leave everything on the surface, even for centuries if necessary, as a way to make them less toxic by transmutation. There is no hurry. But the government and the barons of nuclear are exerting an enormous pressure to begin burial by 2015. They want to hide all signs of the nuisance that has accumulated for half a century and given nuclear energy such a bad image. If the CIGEO project is realized, this will be a precedent for nucleopaths the world over, and they will all follow suit, saying, “après moi, le déluge!
The need to abandon this waste burial project goes hand in hand with the need to stop making more of this infernal nuclear waste. Therefore, we have to conceive of a way to rapidly stop the production of electricity by nuclear energy. It’s difficult to imagine how this could happen. It’s rare to find scientists who criticize these projects. The majority of them are totally indifferent to this problem, and to many other problems as well.
In order to make the plan easier for opponents to swallow, the government is looking for ways to make radioactive waste burial part of a package labelled “energy transition.” Some imbeciles will go along with this in exchange for a few promises of wind turbines and solar panels. We can count on the Socialist Party and the EELV [Europe Ecologie – Les Verts] to go along with such accords.
[To solve this problem] we need a planetary change of consciousness. But in reality, many countries in the world are planning to build nuclear power plants now, including those of the EPR design that run on plutonium. This will lead to a dangerous impasse. There is no solution for the waste, and there is no solution for dismantling power plants. Installations get old, and as they age, radioactivity provokes transmutations, in metal, for example, which then becomes fragile. Many reactions produce helium, which stays in the irradiated material. Helium is inert. It doesn’t chemically combine with anything, so it becomes a hole in a metal crystal. Just by irradiation, a pressurized reactor vessel loses its mechanical resistance. Sooner or later, it becomes unusable. This leads to the problem of the cost of dismantling.
[Instead of facing these problems], we see completely insane plans, and the public ignores their existence. According to the “reasonable trajectory” elaborated by the Parliamentary Office on Scientific and Technical Options, the following plan is foreseen:

·                  Generation II represents 58 reactors presently installed in France.
·                  Generation III is the EPR which will run 100% on MOX fuel, which is plutonium.
·                  Generation IV will be fast-breeder reactors, each containing 20 tons of plutonium, the equivalent of 1000 atomic bombs, and 5000 tons of flammable and explosive sodium.
·                  The construction of the ASTRID prototype has already been approved by François Hollande. Deployment is to commence in 2060 and finish in 2100.

Sources:




2014/02/17

True Lies

There ought to be a word for the kind of truth that is really just an oft-repeated lie. This kind of truth starts off as a bald-faced lie, then goes through a tortuous digestive process in the national psyche, accompanied by lots of cramps and gaseous emanations until it finally emerges as what should be called a truthturd. It then sprouts some lovely turd blossoms that fool enough people into accepting its virtue.
Cases in point: the Tokyo gubernatorial election of February 10th, 2014, and the notion that Japan is doomed to economic failure without nuclear power.
http://www.claybennett.com/

The election was seen as a sort of referendum on nuclear energy in Japan, and the pro-nuclear candidate “won” with a voter turnout that was less than 50% and less than a majority of those votes. The two anti-nuclear candidates had an almost equal number of votes as the “winner.” In a truly democratic system, the result would be thrown out and the election redone until the turnout was high enough to be considered a real reflection of the will of citizens. You could say the citizens were lazy and got the government they deserve, but Tokyo had just been hit with its worst snowfall in decades the night before. In addition, an intelligently designed electoral system would require a runoff to decide a winner with a majority of votes.
After the election results were in, TEPCO coincidentally announced a few days later that its data on some of Fukushima Daiichi’s radioactive leaks had been underestimated by half. Then it turned out that data on 167 samples dated as long ago as 2011 were underestimated because the instruments used maxed out below the actual levels. As was the case with the 2012 national election and the IOC decision on the 2020 Olympics, TEPCO held the bad news so as to not influence political decisions that might have unwelcome consequences for the company.
Also coming right after the election result was known, the press was full of stories about how the national government is now going to press ahead with nuclear reactor restarts by next summer. Everyone, including the journalists regurgitating the government line, seems to have forgotten that Japan now has a new and improved nuclear regulator that is, supposedly, totally independent of politics. Thus, nothing can be restarted if the NRA objects to restarts, and no politician could possibly pass judgment on things like seismic safety, the reliability of old infrastructure, re-education of personnel, or evacuation plans. Right?
The Yomiuri Shimbun ran a story that might as well have been a government press release. It reported, “The government aims to resume operations of nuclear power plants under the plan, after [NOT IF] their safety is confirmed by the ongoing screenings of the Nuclear Regulation Authority.” It is reported like a fait accompli, with the NRA and local prefectural approval assumed as a sure thing.
It must be kept in mind that the Yomiuri was the propaganda arm of the Japanese and American government in the 1950s when President Eisenhower was pushing “atoms for peace” and exports of American nuclear power technology. Nothing has changed. The Yomiuri report was bad enough, but that is not to say that it was much different than others. The New York Times went along for the ride as well.
The media, domestic and foreign, has dutifully reported the lie that Japan’s economy is getting hammered by the extra fossil fuel that electric utilities have to import now that their reactors are off. They fail to report that in the past nuclear accounted for only 20-30% of electricity production, and that the majority of fossil fuel imported is used for other purposes besides generating electricity (transport, industrial uses, heating, cooking). The data shows that the jump in total fossil fuel imports after the nuclear shutdown was about 10-15%, and this is an amount that could be cut with conservation, efficiency gains, and investment in renewables. Furthermore, because of demographics, the loss of dominance in technology exports, and jobs moving to cheaper countries, the economy was moving in a bad direction a long time before the 2011 disaster. It is disingenuous to now blame everything on the loss of nuclear power.
The mainstream view also talks about uranium as if it were a free domestic resource. If we consider energy created by unit of cost, uranium does have an advantage over fossil fuel. However, it still has a significant cost and it has to be imported, which means it doesn’t provide energy security, and it hurts the balance of trade just like fossil fuel imports. Besides the cost of uranium, nuclear energy has huge costs arising from construction, de-construction, insurance, security, and safety assurance. Building and operating a gas power plant amounts a fraction of the cost. Even though the continual cost of importing fuel is a burden, it is at least a cost that is born in the present and not foisted on future generations.
Consumers and businesses are supposed to be begging for the reactors to be turned back on because electric utilities are going to charge 20% more now, and this, apparently, is all because of the nuclear shutdown. Curiously, the 20% matches the 20% devaluation of the yen since Shinzo Abe introduced his “Abenomics,” which of course made imported fuel that much more expensive. And really, is the public supposed to believe that electricity cost is going to come down again after the nuclear reactors are switched back on? Is the Abe government that stupid? Do they think the public is that stupid? Or is the public really that stupid?
The cost of fossil fuel is actually only one of the many daunting costs that electric utilities are faced with. All of the nuclear power plants are being forced to meet new safety requirements. The upgrades are costly, and for some power plants they will be too costly, so safe operation will be deemed impossible. The Hamaoka NPP has built a new seawall as defense against tsunamis at a cost of $1.8 billion, yet there is still the possibility that the regulator will refuse to allow its restart. When the NRA or local governments refuse to allow restarts, utilities will have to pay for decommissioning costs. Then of course, there is Fukushima Daiichi, where the cleanup and compensation costs are growing all the time. Nuclear waste disposal, and the cost of future accidents are not even put into the calculation.
The government and the utilities are being utterly deceptive in failing to disclose how these costs make nuclear-generated electricity much more expensive than what consumers pay now in their utility bills, even with the rate increase included. It seems to be assumed that the government has paid and will always pay for the devastating costs of nuclear energy through general revenue. And general revenue is 50% borrowed money these days, so there's not much difference from the attitude toward nuclear waste. It only looks cheap because the deciders who are alive now will be dead in twenty years and not have to pay the price. The true costs–financial, ecological and moral–have been completely obscured.
The blog Peace and Freedom has some insightful quotes from Japanese officials who are propagating the fear of a nuclear shutdown, but the author failed to critically analyze the assumptions behind them. According to the Institute of Energy Economics in Japan, “… fossil-fuel imports would cause an outflow of national wealth equivalent to 0.6 percent of Japan’s gross domestic product.” The question to ask is how this tiny figure is supposed to be catastrophic, when it is well understood that energy consumption is an indicator of domestic economic activity and resources being turned into value-added goods that are exported. Fossil fuel imports have been the very basis of Japan’s economic miracle. If Japan can no longer work its manufacturing and exporting magic, it’s a sign of a deeper problem with creativity, innovation and competitiveness. It has nothing to do with nuclear energy.
Elsewhere in the article, Hirohide Hirai, director of policy evaluation and public relations at the Economy, Trade, and Industry Ministry, is quoted as saying, “The reliance on the hydrocarbons makes Japan vulnerable from the energy-security perspective. You have to pay a lot, a lot, a lot for LNG imports. If something happens in the Strait of Hormuz today, that makes—oh, I don’t want to think about it.”
Yes, indeed, the world is a scary place. Why not repeat “a lot” just a few more times for us? Mr. Hirai’s horror story could give us all chills on a summer night and lessen the need of air conditioners. One can shudder and get scared about various man-made and natural disasters that would leave populations freezing in the dark, but invoking this “Strait of Hormuz” bogey man is an absurd way to debate energy policy. For one thing, Japan has other supply lines from Russia, North America and Indonesia. And, yes, Japan is very vulnerable to energy supply shocks, as many nations are. That’s just a part of the bargain a nation makes if it doesn’t want to have an 18th century lifestyle. Furthermore, even if every nuclear power plant in the country were operating, the loss of fossil fuel supplies would be more crippling to the economy than the loss of nuclear power. Fossil fuel is the only source of energy for airplanes, trucks and cars, most homes use it for heat and cooking, and it has always supplied (even at the peak of nuclear generation) about 60% of electricity.
The claim that nuclear energy is cheap, green and essential is an utter falsehood, perpetuated by some people who know it, and by others who are too dim to understand the nature of the monster they have created. Who in his right mind in this land of earthquakes and volcanoes, after all that has happened at Fukushima Daiichi, would switch on another nuclear reactor? It's time for everyone to stop and listen to the voices from Chernobyl, like the one who said, “They grabbed God by the beard, and now he’s laughing, but we’re the ones who pay for it.”

Sources:




Svetlana Alexievich. Voices from Chernobyl: The Oral History of a Nuclear Disaster (1997, published in English by Picador in 2006).

John E. Carey (editor). “Why Japan Can’t Quit Nuclear Power.” Peace and Freedom: Policy and World Ideas. February 16, 2013. http://johnib.wordpress.com/2013/02/16/why-japan-cant-quit-nuclear-power/.