2014/03/16

Thyroid Rage

It’s hard to imagine what motivates so many medical professionals to interpret epidemiological findings in a way that supports the views of the nuclear industry. It’s equally hard to understand why editors and journalists so readily go to such people and accept their glib denials that the nuclear disaster has had or will have any impact on public health.
photo from Al Jazeera

A case in point is this week’s National Geographic interview with Norman Kleiman of the Department of Environmental Health Sciences at the Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health in New York City.
The interviewer asked him to comment on the fact that there have been 33 confirmed cases of thyroid cancer in children in Fukushima prefecture since the nuclear catastrophe in 2011. The writer conveniently omits the detail that there are another 42 suspected cases, many of which will be confirmed at a more convenient time when the mass media is paying less attention to the issue. It should also be emphasized that for every cancer there are many more cases of damaged thyroid function, a fact which makes the nuclear accident a much more serious public health problem than it appears to be.
In any case, this finding of 33 cases among 245,000 children converts to a rate of  about 132 per million, a 61-fold increase over the normal rate of 2 per million (quoted in the National Geographic article). The American National Cancer Institute shows thyroid cancer occurring in 2010 at a rate of 1 per 100,000 for people under the age of 20. If this rate were taken as normal, then the finding of 33 cases per 245,000 equals a rate of 13 per 100,000.
The official line in Japan is that this increase can be put down to the screening effect. That is, if you go looking for a disease, you’ll find more of it than you would just by waiting for sick people to walk into a clinic. Norman Kleiman, along with the nuclear industry, agrees with this interpretation. Interestingly, they seem to assume, without presenting evidence, that the existing estimate of 2 per million was not a product of rigorous epidemiological research that screened a population. They suggest that the Fukushima survey was the first time that a population has ever been intensively screened for thyroid cancer.
Dr. Kleiman went on to even compare thyroid cancer to prostate cancer in older men. Increased screening for prostate cancer turns up more small, slow-growing tumors that patients would be better off ignoring because they will probably die from something else before the tumor becomes a problem.
It’s hard to know what to make of such an inappropriate comparison coming from a physician. I’m just an amateur, but I think I can see the differences between a child’s thyroid cancer and an old man’s prostate cancer. Cancers in children are known to grow more quickly than they do in adults over age 50. A child’s thyroid is a vital organ needed for proper development and endocrine functioning, whereas the prostate gland of a man over fifty is not so essential. It is extremely insensitive to equate a tumor in a child’s thyroid with a tumor in an old man’s prostate. The child needs to keep that organ healthy for seventy years, so the finding of a tumor in it is sure to be alarming. It is cold comfort for the parents or the child involved to be told what can be said to older men with prostate trouble--“just keep an eye on it, you’ll probably die of something else first.”
In addition, Dr. Kleiman gets a few of his facts wrong and shows only a passing familiarity with the Fukushima Daiichi catastrophe. He claimed that the Chernobyl research showed thyroid cancer appearing after four years, but in fact, several research projects showed that thyroid cancers started to appear within two to three years of the catastrophe. They were described as more aggressive and with an earlier onset than the thyroid cancers that arise from other causes.(1)
Dr. Kleiman's interpretation of Chernobyl research illustrates the ways that the Soviet response to Chernobyl gets twisted to be either terrible or wonderful, depending on the spin that is necessary. Dr. Kleiman says that the Soviets did a terrible job protecting children from consuming milk and water laced with radioactive iodine, but we are to believe that later on they were flawless in detecting every case of thyroid cancer.
Dr. Kleiman also naively believes that people in Fukushima did not consume products laced with radioactive iodine in the first weeks after the accident, and he fails to mention that a significant concern aside from ingestion is the inhalation dose. No one (except some medical personnel who took care of themselves) got prophylactic doses of stable iodine, and the situation was generally chaotic, just as it was in the USSR. People were not warned of the dangers, and false assurances went out, even though data on the fallout was not available. Delivery trucks came to a certain point, but drivers bailed out when they got close to the radiation and left many people further down the road without vital supplies. Perhaps some people got bottled water, but many more had to settle for whatever they could get when they got thirsty. Regardless, the inhalation doses were enough of a concern for even Dr. Yamashita of Fukushima University Hospital to admit his error. He finally saw the data long after he had assured people there was nothing to be concerned about.(2)(3)
Dr. Kleiman also falsely described what cesium does in the body. He described it as accumulating in “fatty tissue” when in fact it goes to all connective tissue such as tendons, ligaments, fascia, skin, fibrous tissues, and fat, and to muscles, nerves and blood vessels. This is just a bit of Wikipedia fact checking that a doctor could have done before he went on record in a high profile magazine. Likewise, the journalist could have done some checking before the article went to print.
The doctor finishes by regurgitating the standard condescending nonsense that comes from nuclear advocates–comparing fission products from a nuclear accident with the radiation found in granite counter tops, bananas and rays from the sun--as if that should make people relax when a nuclear reactor is melting down and exploding a few miles from their homes. Everything he said in this interview resembles numerous other pronouncements assuring the world that Fukushima will have no health consequences. They all seem to be getting their talking points from the same source. 
   He claims that no one in Fukushima is living there with any serious “concentration” that will lead to health effects. Such statements are always made in willful neglect of the real danger of internal contamination. Of course, he had to finish by adding that the real problem is the “anxiety and fear of living in what people perceive as a contaminated area.” He adds the word “perceive” to deny a fact which the IAEA, the nuclear industry and nuclear opponents agree on. There is no perception problem. The land is contaminated.
All in all, this is a shameful gloss of a deadly serious, large-scale public health problem caused by corporate malpractice and negligence. National Geographic is seen by many as an inspirational educational resource, so it is all the more regrettable that the magazine failed to do much better research on this subject and failed to consult with a medical professional who has direct experience and in-depth knowledge of the Fukushima catastrophe and its impact on the people there. But after all, this may be the desired slant of the publication. The magazine is still ostensibly managed independently by the National Geographic Society, but National Geographic Channel is owned by Rupert Murdoch's 21st Century Fox.
At one point Dr. Kleiman said, “I'm not a pediatric endocrinologist, and I don't want to speculate..,” which just makes me wonder why the interviewer didn’t stop there, forget the speculations and go find a pediatric endocrinologist. It’s not clear why the National Geographic staff chose to interview Dr. Kleiman, a person who appears to have read from a list of talking points, with little knowledge of the event he was asked to comment on. It seems like the editors just went to someone who was easy to find locally.
Finally, there is a glaringly obvious point overlooked by those who say that the high incidence of childhood thyroid cancer in Fukushima is due to the screening effect. If it is true that the same result would come from surveying any population anywhere else, then the health authorities in Fukushima have really made a shocking, high-impact medical discovery that people all over the world will want to know about. Thyroid cancer in children is 61 times more common than we once believed it was! Any proper scientific review of this finding would insist that the researchers at Fukushima Medical University attempt to replicate their findings on a population not affected by a massive release of Iodine 131. This is the only way to confirm their conclusion, but it’s a certainty that Japanese officials will avoid doing it all costs. Don't ask a question if you know the answer is not going to be the answer you wanted. Yet there is always the possibility that their assumption is correct because there are a lot of toxins in the environment that affect thyroid function. If this research on children in Fukushima truly does imply that the global rate of thyroid cancer is so high, then this is a finding that deserves much more attention than it has got so far.

Notes:

(1) Some quotes from sources listed below:

“The high incidence of childhood thyroid cancer in Belarus is suspected to be due to radiation exposure after the Chernobyl reactor accident…  All of the preceding thyroid carcinomas developed after longer latency periods, whereas tumors arising in the Chernobyl population began developing with surprising rapidity and short latency.” (Shirahige et. al.)

“… absence of marked latency period is another feature of radiation-induced thyroid cancers caused in Belarus as a result of this accident.” (Malko)

“[the latent period for thyroid cancer is] 2.5 years, based on low estimates used for lifetime risk modeling of low-level ionizing radiation studies.” (Howard)

(2) Dr. Shunichi Yamashita: I thought, "Oops..." After Seeing the SPEEDI Simulation Map on March 23, 2011. Ex-skf. November, 2011. http://ex-skf.blogspot.jp/2013/11/dr-shunichi-yamashita-i-thought-oops.html. This source is a translation of Asahi Shinbun’s in-depth report Trap of Prometheus on the chaos March 2011. The report tells how the head of the medical team overseeing the response to the catastrophe discovered too late that Iodine 131 levels were indeed very high and that stable iodine should have been given to the population immediately.

(3) Miyake et al. determined a very effective way to reconstruct the fallout of Iodine 131 after it has decayed away. Iodine 131 has a short half-life of eight days but a high energy rate that makes it very damaging to the thyroid gland. Since it is completely gone after about ten half-lives, it is difficult to determine what inhabitants were exposed to in particular areas. Miyake et al. found that Iodine 129, with a 16 million-year half-life and a proportionately much lower energy, was found in the Fukushima fallout in a fixed ratio with Iodine 131 of about 32:1. To know how much Iodine 131 fell in a particular place, one can determine the amount of Iodine 129 still in the soil. Thus there should be no fatalistic shrugging and talk of how we’ll never know what children were exposed to.

Sources:

John Howard. “Minimum Latency & Types or Categories of Cancer” Administrator World Trade Center Health Program, 9.11 Monitoring and Treatment, Revision: May 1, 2013.

Mikhail V. Malko. “Chernobyl Radiation-induced Thyroid Cancers in Belarus.”
Joint Institute of Power and Nuclear Research, National Academy of Sciences of Belarus. 2002.

Y. Shirahige, M. Ito, K. Ashizawa, T. Motomura, N. Yokoyama, H. Namba, S. Fukata, T. Yokozawa, N. Ishikawa, T. Mimura, S. Yamashita, I. Sekine, K. Kuma, K. Ito, S. Nagataki. “Childhood thyroid cancer: comparison of Japan and Belarus.” Endocrine Journal, 1998 Apr;45(2):203-9.

Justin McCurry. “Fukushima's children at centre of debate over rates of thyroid cancer.” The Guardian. March 9, 2014.


2014/03/10

The Narrow Road to the Radiant North

As the third anniversary of the earthquake-tsunami-meltdown disaster comes around, there is too much to possibly say, so I’ll be brief and say it with a picture.
The sketch above is a mash-up of a famous sketch by the 18th-19th century artist Hokusai, who is better known for his colorful woodblock prints such as the Thirty-six Views of Mount Fuji. The sketch above depicts the famous 17th century Haiku master Matsuo Basho who wrote about his journey to the great beyond in The Narrow Road to the Deep North. The scene depicts him on the road, but now with a thyroidectomy scar on his neck and a contemporary scene in the distance.
Some might think it is wrong to rework national art treasures to make a satirical point about energy policy, but I think the old masters would approve of any action that protests what has become of the country they revered in their art.
When Shinzo Abe was prime minister for the first time in 2006, his stump speech referred often to a wish to make a “beautiful country,” as if Japan was not beautiful, or never had been, or had to be beautiful once again. In his second coming in the 2012 campaign, he conjured up more vague wishes saying “take back Japan” or “Japan is back.” He never specified how it had been taken away, or what it was back from or back to. The implication, of course, was that he and his party were the rightful owners.
When it comes to all this talk of restoration and making a beautiful country, we have to keep in mind who turned Japan into a nuclear waste repository, and who is busy denying that the stunning spike in childhood thyroid cancer rates has anything to do with a cloud of radioactive iodine that blew over the deep north. If anyone is angry that treasured art has been defiled, they should ask themselves the very old question of whether art or life is more important. Those children awaiting treatment for thyroid cancer might like to know how their fellow citizens would answer the question.
Abe's "take back Japan" posters in one of the yet-to-be beautified
locales in rural Japan. The sign in the foreground says "danger,"
the arrow points left.



2014/03/07

Remembrance of March 10th and 11th in Japan

Originally published on March 7, 2014. Updated on March 11, 2020.


Every year in Japan in early March news organizations, citizens and activist groups prepare to commemorate the anniversary of earthquake-tsunami-meltdown disaster that occurred in Northeastern Japan on March 11, 2011. It would be good to note another important event from March 9-10, 1945 and see the traces that connect it with the events of 2011.

On night of March 9-10, 1945, US forces struck Tokyo with the most destructive air raid in history. It caused such an inferno of boiling asphalt and rivers that probably killed more people in one night than either of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This date is not as well-known as those of the atomic bombings in August that year, and the reason is largely political.



In the West, people tend to be Eurocentric in their knowledge of the war, so they know about London and Dresden, but not about Tokyo. Tokyo was the capital and headquarters of the Allied Occupation that lasted from 1945-52, so for seven years there was little motive to make historical evaluations of the event. The pro-American, anti-communist government that followed the occupation had just as little interest in dwelling on historical events that would remind people of the war. Another reason that a publicly funded memorial doesn’t exist is that there would be no political compromise in the controversy over how to portray Japan as an aggressor in the war, not only as a victim of the air raids. The citizens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were more successful at resisting the national government pressure to sweep history under the carpet, but this never happened in Tokyo to such an extent, so the night of March 10 is not memorialized as much as the atomic bombings.

Memorial of the air raid in Sumida Ward, Tokyo

A report in the Seattle Times back in 2005 claimed the reason for this was the sensitive feelings of the victims, but this rational wouldn’t explain why Hiroshima and Nagasaki did much more to commemorate their experiences. In any case, a
memorial in a Tokyo park was finally opened in 2001, and a small museum called the Center of the Tokyo Raids and War Damage opened in 2002 with private donations and no official support.

In 2013 Prime Minister Abe said the bombing of Tokyo by the United States in 1945 was against the “humanitarian principles of international law” of that time. In March 2020, a friend who is quite knowledgeable on this history, Satoko Oka Norimatsu, provided more information on what was behind the statement of the Japanese government:

Our apartment is near the Tokyo Air Raid museum (officially called “The Center of the Tokyo Raids and War Damage”), so I have been there many times. The whole exhibit will be renewed and will reopen in April (I don’t know the exact date). My father’s family lost their home not in the Shitamachi raid but the Yamanote raid of May 24/25, 1945. No one in his family was hurt to my knowledge. I was just curious about where you mentioned what Abe said in 2013 about the raid being against the humanitarian principle in international law, and so I did some searching. In fact, I think it was a way for him to get away with actually stating it was not against international law of that time.

Fukushima Mizuho’s question is here (transcript in Japanese).
Abe’s answer is here (transcript in Japanese).

Abe said to Fukushima, “It cannot be said entirely that the Tokyo raid was against the international law of that time, but it was inconsistent with the humanitarian principle, which was one of the basic principles underlying international law.” Later, in 2015, Independent House of Councilors member Taro Yamamoto challenged Abe about the government’s stance on the Tokyo air raids in the context of Abe’s support of the American wars that violate international law, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and the so-called “War on Terror.” It is a noteworthy exchange (transcript in Japanese).

What Mr. Yamamoto said was very well said indeed. In this case, Abe used Foreign Minister Kishida to give an answer that is almost the same as the 2013 statement. Then Yamamoto challenged Abe as to why he couldn’t answer with his own words and whether Japan could not accuse their master nation of their past wrongdoing or even why it could not judge the deeds of a nation that is a permanent perpetrator of war crimes. Of course, he should have also referred to the Empire of Japan as a past permanent perpetrator of war crimes, but other than this shortcoming, Yamamoto’s challenge was perfect.

If there is a tenuous connection between March 10 and March 11, it must be in the fact that March 10 was indicative of the how the world had been desensitized to sacrificing civilian during the six years of WWII. German, British, Japanese and American air raids paved the way to making atomic bombing seem like a reasonable thing to do to civilians in an enemy nation, and there has been a similar desensitization in modern times to making civilians suffer for national energy policy.

The regrets about the bombing of civilians after the war seem to have been expressed in Japan and the US only as an urge to develop nuclear energy under the slogan “atoms for peace.” Sixty-six years later, a civilian Japanese population was again assaulted by nuclear technology. Coincidentally, the eastern region of Tokyo that was heavily affected in the air raid is also the part of Tokyo where the most radioactive hotspots have been found since Fukushima Daiichi exploded. For some reason, the rain fell in a particular way on a swath of land between eastern Tokyo and Kashiwa City in Chiba prefecture.

Another ironic connection between March 10 and March 11 shows a certain regress, as opposed to progress, in the moral standards governments live up to. As wicked as the wartime Japanese government was, it still had enough concern for the children of Tokyo to relocate them to the countryside, and many lives were spared on March 10, 1945 by this precaution. The veteran anti-nuclear activist Takashi Hirose is one of the few people who have asked why a country impoverished by war was able to muster the resources to protect its children, but the present government cannot arrange evacuation of children in a rural prefecture to protect them from radioactive fallout. (Watch his speech here, and select English subtitles in the “captions” icon on the bottom right of the screen.)

So what good could have possibly come out of all this history? I came to Japan in 1986 on a desperate lark to have an adventure and make some money teaching English. In those days, I bore an uncanny resemblance to a young Royal Canadian Air Force pilot I’d seen in a photo, an uncle I never met, who was shot down and killed during one of his first bombing raids over Holland to destroy a German-controlled runway--something that British officers probably understood as effectively a suicide mission. Fifty years later, a nephew the pilot never saw married the granddaughter of a survivor of the Tokyo air raid. No one in either of our families had a problem with intermarriage. It had become completely unremarkable. Three children came from this, and everyone around here calls them “halfs,” but I prefer to think of them as “doubles.” My wife and my children probably wouldn’t have existed if my father-in-law hadn’t missed the air raid by being one of those children sent out of Tokyo during WWII. This fact can only make me wonder what future potential is being erased by the Japanese government’s insistence on keeping children in Fukushima.



Sources

Excellent source of paintings, photos and documents in English and Japanese at http://www.japanairraids.org/



Joseph Coleman. “1945 Tokyo firebombing left legacy of terror, pain.” Seattle Times. March 9, 2005.

2014/03/05

Radiation, let me compare thee

We know Japan has heightened levels of radiation, but what about those killer vending machines?
When I entered university, I quickly became aware that there were three types of people on campus: students in the humanities, others in commerce (the blanket term there for studies in economics, management  and finance), and the rest in engineering and sciences. At first, it seemed like a joke, like a contrived distinction on a school sports day when students are divided into red team, blue team and white team. But as time went on, I realized these were very serious and useful distinctions to last through a lifetime, perhaps even a very solid element of a theory of human nature. Thirty years later, the distinctions seem more pronounced than ever.
There are very few people who can live in more than one of these worlds, although the commerce and engineering types seem to move in each other’s world more easily. My university had a requirement that all undergraduates had to pass English 100 and at least one course in the sciences. This led to many strained relationships of convenience between people who couldn’t stand each other’s company. One would ask for help with an English paper in exchange for notes from a science course. Each would be embarrassed by his or her weakness, impatient with the other’s weakness, yet proud of his or her own strengths. And they hated each other’s world view. Usually, the relationships didn’t last long enough to make the study exchange bear any fruit.
These ancient animosities have been on my mind since I started writing about nuclear issues. I’ve encountered many defenses of the nuclear industry that remind me how difficult it is to exchange views with someone with a completely different set of cognitive skills who lives and works among like-minded people with shared interests. When we meet, we seem to each other like alien creatures speaking an unintelligible language. On a few occasions, I’ve come across arguments made by engineers that are pronounced with great confidence because they have been propped up within their insular world. As soon as they are uttered outside that world, the situation is just embarrassing because it is readily apparent that they are based on poor analogies, illogic and obliviousness to the wider questions beyond material utility–questions about morality, philosophy and creative ways to avoid ecological destruction.
One such example is the idea that the nuclear industry is moving toward perfection with each meltdown that provides valuable “lessons learned.” This idea of the perfectibility of the technology is enough to make me wonder if I’m not the one who is being quixotic. The nuclear lobby thinks of themselves as conservative, hard-nosed realists. They say, "You can’t put the genie back in the bottle. This is the reality. Deal with it. Don’t be a quixotic fool dreaming about a nuclear-free world." But when it comes to the record of nuclear disasters, they are suddenly utopian dreamers ready to spout about the perfectibility of man.
It was put to me once that nuclear perfection will be just like the history of boiler accidents. Once, when boiler technology was new, there were many accidents and many deaths, but now there are few because of better regulation and designs. Actually, Wikipedia lists about forty famous boiler accidents, and they seem to still be occurring in recent history. But in any case, the important thing is that we’ve all forgotten about the boiler disasters of the past because they aren’t surrounded by massive sacrifice zones where no one can live or cultivate the land. The broken boilers didn’t leave a molten core of radioactive waste leaking into the groundwater for centuries to come. The ruins of boilers were cleaned up quickly because the site was not too radioactive for humans to work in. Clearing up the site didn’t take four decades and 100 billion dollars. Boiler disasters were not low-consequence events for the people who died in them, but they were low-impact in terms of their broader effects. There is just no basis here for a comparison with the meltdown of a nuclear reactor.
Another strange argument I’ve heard is that the nuclear industry is unfairly targeted for regulation, and provokes too much irrational public anxiety. Risk is everywhere, so another argument suggested that hamburger restaurants should be regulated so that cholesterol consumption is reduced to the lowest possible level that is known to cause no harm. It’s surprising to me that the highly trained scientists and engineers who run the nuclear industry can actually be proud of such arguments. When I was younger, I sort of admired the people who could pass advanced calculus and physics courses, but now I wonder if this talent comes at the expense of other faculties of reasoning.
It seems to me that it shouldn’t be necessary to explain to a nuclear engineer the difference between cholesterol and anthropogenic radionuclides. The former is an organic molecule that has been part of the human diet since before we evolved into humans. It has benefits in itself, and delivers more benefits because of the protein and other nutrients that come with it in many foods. We have ways of sensing when we’ve had too much, we know when we are eating it, and we can freely choose to have more or less of it. None of these things is true of anthropogenic radionuclides. They’ve been in our food and water for only a few decades, and the decision to put them there came without the consent of the victim. They have no role in organic chemistry, and no benefits to offer in living organisms. They are poisons. We have no way to sense when we have been exposed to them, and thus no way to avoid them. To protect ourselves from them, we must rely on experts whose function it is to promote the nuclear industry, not to protect individual health. When a nuclear expert argues that the nuclear industry is unfairly targeted and regulated, he is showing that he doesn’t understand what it is about the field he works in that makes it uniquely hazardous and fully deserving of public oversight and skepticism.
I encountered the first two examples in private conversations. The next one comes from the book The Highway of the Atom, by Peter Van Wyck. He critiqued the Government of Canada study that whitewashed the radioactive contamination of the Dene people on Great Bear Lake (which is another story covered in more detail here). The lead fact-finder of the study, Walter Keyes, is vocally pro-nuclear and generally opposed to regulation. He worked for the firm Intertec Management Limited which was contracted to conduct the study. He was also a former deputy minister in the Saskatchewan government (which promotes uranium mining in the province) and he belongs to the lobby group Canadian Nuclear Association. Van Wyck discovered a publication in which Keyes seems to be seriously complaining that vending machines deserve to be more regulated and publicly feared than the nuclear industry because they have caused several deaths over the years (because once in a while angry customers shake them until they topple over), whereas nuclear power plants caused none. Van Wyck cites these words that Keyes spoke to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency:

Although there have been no recorded deaths in North America from radiation exposures at either uranium mines or nuclear power facilities during the past 30 years, there have been enormous sums of money spent on regulation, inspection and enforcement. Yet, in contrast there have been 30 reported deaths in North America from vending machines during the past 20 years–and that’s from the machines themselves, without looking at what may be the hazardous contents of the machines such as cigarettes, food products and other items. Does this mean that government is over-regulating the nuclear industry or under-regulating the vending industry? Is this a case where the cumulative impact on the environment and public safety of vending machines has been overlooked because each incremental item is seen as being so very small without fully understanding the overall impacts? (1)(2)
We can leave aside the fact that Keyes sets the parameters narrowly as deaths by radiation on site. There is plenty of evidence suggesting that the nuclear industry has slowly killed many people offsite. Of more concern is that a lead investigator in a study on the health effects of radiation disingenuously tries here to deny the potential of the nuclear industry to cause disasters of wide-scale consequence. He pretends not to understand what it is about nuclear technology that makes the public want to have it more strictly controlled than vending machine technology.
The three arguments discussed here are just some examples of how the nuclear lobby develop these non sequiturs among themselves and become laughably over-confident in their ability to present convincing arguments to the public. One would think that people so well trained in the sciences would be more skilled in logical rhetoric. In fact, I think they would be capable of better rhetoric if there were indeed any good arguments to be made. Lacking them, all they can do is make very weak analogies to boilers, hamburgers and vending machines.
So let me offer a suggestion. Forget the analogies. There is nothing else like nuclear physics, even though it does provide some powerful metaphors for many abstract phenomena. I would give the same advice to anti-nuclear people. You can compare radioactive contamination to assault on the integrity of the body, but the analogy only goes so far. Direct violence (person on person) is illegal, but the same cannot be said of the activities of the nuclear industry. Its activities are licensed and its accidents do not result in criminal prosecution.
Strangely enough, radiation can be the source of a metaphor, but not the target. Meaning is very effectively conveyed when we talk about a policy that is too radioactive for the president to mention, or when we warn about a financial meltdown, but it’s senseless to say, “Stay away from that nuclear reactor. It’ll get you like a vending machine.” As a rhetorical device, this is cheap sarcasm, I know. But seriously, there is nothing else like radiation. I suspect that the reason is that metaphors are drawn from the natural world, what the human mind understands instinctively from its long evolution. We can easily conceive of birth as arrival and death as departure, but what is beta decay? Until the 20th century, radiation was irrelevant to life, and it is still outside of sensory experience, so there is no way to make it the target of an insightful, interesting metaphor.

(1)
Walter Keyes and Dennis Lawson. Presentation to Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency. Saskatoon, February 29, 2000, on behalf of the Risk Assessment Society. Cited in: Peter C. Van Wyck. The Highway of the Atom (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010). Pages 186-187.
(2)
United States Consumer Product Safety Commission. CPSC, Soda Vending Machine Industry Labeling Campaign Warns Of Deaths And Injuries. November 2, 1995.

2014/02/23

The Hibakusha who Apologized for Hiroshima and Nagasaki

In the summer of 1998, representatives of the Dene people of Great Bear Lake went to Hiroshima to express their remorse for having hauled ore from the Port Radium mine to supply fuel for the atomic bombs dropped on Japan. They had no foreknowledge of what they were participating in, and they suffered horribly afterwards from the effects of radiation, but still they felt responsible.
Until the 1990s, because of their isolation and neglect by the Canadian government, they had little understanding of where those “money rocks” had gone, and little awareness of the rocks’ connection to numerous deaths among them from strange new illnesses. But then journalists, academics and filmmakers began to appear with questions about the past and information about the causes of those illnesses. The Dene were dismayed by the neglect they had suffered, but were equally burdened by the new awareness of what they had helped to bring upon Japanese people. Their sense of responsibility knew nothing of the civilized impulse toward self-exculpation. They felt responsible for not having asked questions about what they had agreed to work on, for not having made every effort to understand the implications of their participation. That’s an ethical standard that few people could live up to.
In 1998, Canadian journalists shed light on the story of the Port Radium mine, and in 1999 the documentary film Village of Widows covered the story and the trip by the Dene to Japan. Peter van Wyck returned to it more recently in his book Highway of the Atom (2010). Nonetheless, the story is forgotten (or never-known) history for most Canadians. When a nuclear-powered Soviet satellite crashed over the Northwest Territories in 1978, widely dispersing radioactive waste in the region, it was an irony lost on everyone.
The most interesting twist in the story is that in 2005-06, during the peak of the so-called “nuclear renaissance,” a film director, David Henningson, headed up to Great Bear Lake to make a film called Somba ke: The Money Place about the relations between the Dene and Hiroshima and Nagasaki (watch it on youtube here). During preparations he found that attitudes had shifted, and he ended up making a film very different from the one he had set out to make. The Dene were now reluctant to speak of the past because a mining company called Alberta Star had concluded an agreement with them to reopen the mine. Canadian author Douglas Coupland was a major shareholder, along with his brother, the CEO. This time, of course, the Dene were promised that things would be different. The next year, in 2008, the Deline Land Corporation (Dene controlled) announced they would oppose all future uranium development until remaining issues with the old Port Radium mine were resolved. Alberta Star's stock was $3 in the days of the "nuclear renaissance," but today (Feb. 23, 2014) in the post-Fukushima world, it trades at $0.21. 
   At other active uranium mine sites in Northern Canada, aboriginal communities are divided on their support for nuclear energy(1), but for the most part they have made peace with the atom and are working for and with uranium mining companies. As far as I know, none of them have offered apologies for Fukushima Daiichi.
   The article below gives a good overview of the history of Port Radium from the 1930s to 1990s. It no longer exists on the Calgary Herald website, though the journalist who wrote it, Andrew Nikiforuk, has been active since, covering the Alberta Tar Sands and the energy crisis. A few versions of this article are posted on web pages that seem to have not been attended to since the 1990s. I’ve tried to restore it to a readable version that does not have each sentence and quotation formatted as a separate paragraph.

(1) Andrew Loewen. "Legal action seeks transparency from Northern Village of Pinehouse regarding uranium contracts." Briarpatch Magazine. January 27, 2014.
http://briarpatchmagazine.com/announcements/view/legal-action-pinehouse
__________________________________

Echoes of the Atomic Age: Cancer kills fourteen aboriginal uranium workers
by Andrew Nikiforuk
Calgary Herald, Alberta, Canada
originally published on Saturday, March 14, 1998

At the dawn of the nuclear age, Paul Baton and more than 30 Dene hunters and trappers innocently called uranium “the money rock.” Paid $3 a day by their white employers, the Dene hauled and ferried burlap sacks of the grimy ore from the world’s first uranium mine at Port Radium, across the Northwest Territories to Fort McMurray. Since then, at least 14 Dene who worked at the mine between 1942 and 1960 have died of lung, colon and kidney cancers, according to documents obtained through the N.W.T. Cancer Registry.
The Port Radium mine supplied the uranium to fuel the $2-billion effort to make the first atomic bombs. “Before the mine, you never heard of cancer,” said Baton, 83. “Now, lots of people have died of cancer.” Charged Cindy Gilday, chairwoman of the Deline’s Uranium Committee: “In my mind it’s a war crime that has been well hidden. The Dene were the first civilian victims of the war and are the last to be addressed.”
The Dene, who say they were never told of uranium’s hazards, will decide next weekend whether to sue or seek a settlement with the federal government. Declassified U.S. documents show that the U.S. government, which was the buyer, and Ottawa, then the world’s largest supplier, withheld health and safety information from miners, as well as natives.
Robie Chatterjee, head of health physics and risk with the Atomic Energy Control Board, responded to the news of the high incidence of cancers among the Dene by saying: “We were not aware of this (the cancers). It definitely deserves more investigation.”
The federal government owned Eldorado Mining and Refining and regulated the uranium industry. It privatized the firm in 1988.
During the mine’s heyday in the 1950s, many Dene slept on the ore, ate fish from water contaminated by radioactive tailings and breathed radioactive dust while on the barges, docks and portages. More than a dozen men carried sacks of ore weighing more than 45 kilograms for 12 hours a day, six days a week, four months a year. “That might be comparable to taking a chest X-ray every week for a year with an old machine,” said Dr. David Bates, an environmental health analyst and chair of British Columbia’s royal commission on uranium in 1980.
“The people at the time didn’t speak English,” said Shirley Baton-Modest, 33, a Deline resident. “I think my people were used as guinea-pigs. They were never informed of the dangers.” A 1991 federal aboriginal health survey found the Deline community reporting twice as much illness as any other Canadian aboriginal community. But the federal government has never studied the Dene’s health-related concerns -- specifically cancer.
André Corriveau, the Northwest Territories’ chief medical officer of health, noted that high cancer rates among the Dene don’t differ significantly from the overall territorial profile. However, the death rate is skewed by high rates of smoking among the Inuit, he said.
Andy Orkin, an Ontario lawyer who deals with aboriginal and environmental issues, will present a brief to the Dene next week. “We left them to die and hoped they would never ask any questions,” he said.
Fourteen of the 30 Dene who worked at the Port Radium, N.W.T. uranium mine have died of cancer. Declassified documents on the U.S. atomic weapons and energy program reveal that both the Canadian and American governments knew in the early 1940s of the deadly hazards of uranium extraction. Yet for two decades Ottawa failed to warn thousands of miners and natives of the risks they faced daily. Now, the elders of Deline must decide whether to seek a settlement -- or sue for compensation.
Just south of the Arctic Circle on the shores of Great Bear Lake, the surviving elders of Deline now say the Prophet warned them. These are the people whose dead husbands and brothers hauled the raw uranium ore that helped make the bombs that obliterated Hiroshima and Nagasaki; the ones who still have no word for radiation.
In immaculate white-walled bungalows, the elders nod at a stark photograph of a bearded figure and say in hushed and saddened tones, “Yes, Grandfather told us.” Until his death in 1940, Louis Ayah, one of the North’s great aboriginal seers, repeatedly warned his people that the waters in Great Bear Lake would turn a foul yellow. According to “Grandfather,” the yellow poison would flow toward the village, recalls Madelaine Bayha, one of a dozen scarfed and skirted “uranium widows” in the village. “The prophet spoke about that poison. He said that there would be sickness and that people would go through hard times and that there would be deaths,” says Bayha, 82. Her husband, Joseph, worked for years at the uranium mine and died as many white miners did: coughing himself to death.
Fifty years after the first atomic bomb, the Cold War and the economic boom that was uranium, the elders in this community of 600 people are beginning to understand the meaning of that disturbing vision. They realize that the ore mined from their ancestral hunting grounds became the ingredient of mass destruction; that the poison was none other than radiation and its deadly progeny; and that the source was Port Radium, the world’s first uranium mine -- a primitive and often secret Crown company called Eldorado Mining and Refining, run by the federal government from 1942 to 1960.
They also suspect that many of the 18 deaths caused by cancer or lung diseases in the community in the past 30 years may be all part of the forgotten mine’s radioactive legacy and that of its transport arm, Northern Transportation Co. Ltd. And they have many questions. Why did the federal government, their guardian, and Eldorado, a defunct Crown corporation, never tell them of the dangers of uranium mining? Why, in a community where cancers were unknown and elders once lived into their 90s, have so many men died in their 60s and 70s?
“Something’s wrong. A lot of people have died of cancer in the last 15 years,” says Paul Baton, 83. As a young man he and more than 30 other Dene men barged or hauled 100-pound bags of uranium ore concentrate along a 2,100-kilometre transportation web of rivers, rapids and portages known as the “Highway of the Atom.” In addition to serving as coolies for the war effort, the Dene ate fish from contaminated dredging ponds. Their children played with the dusty ore at river docks and portage landings. And their women sewed tents from used uranium sacks.
The boatmen often slept atop ore-filled barges and nearly a dozen families regularly hunted, camped and fished at areas that a federal government study on radioactive wastes identified in 1994 as having “elevated gamma radiation, due to spillage of uranium ore.”
“Before the mine, you never heard of cancer,” says Baton, a small man with clear eyes and a strong face. “Not once. . . . The river pilots I knew all died of cancer. The families that cut logs for the mine are all gone. Something is wrong.”
Although proving that a specific radioactive dose caused a specific individual cancer is problematic, scientists generally agree that there is no safe threshold for radiation exposure. All exposures carry some risk of cancer or genetic effects and there is no doubt that the many Dene were routinely exposed to gamma radiation and radioactive dust over a period of 20 years.
The first Dene to die of cancer, or what elders still call “the incurable disease,” was Old Man Ferdinand in 1960. He had worked at the mine site as a logger, guide and stevedore for nearly a decade. “It was Christmastime and he wanted to shake hands with all the people as they came back from hunting,” recalls Rene Fumoleau, then an Oblate missionary working in Deline. After saying goodbye to the last family that came in, Ferdinand declared: “‘Well, I guess I shook hands with everyone now,’ and he died three hours later.”
Others followed in the next decade. Victor Dolphus’ arm came off when he tried to start an outboard motor. Dolphus, who had worked at the mine site for years, needed a contraption to hold up his neck before the cancer finished him. Joe Kenny, a boat pilot, died of colon cancer. His son, Napoleon, a deck hand, died of stomach cancer. And so on. The premature death of so many men has not only left many widows but interrupted the handing down of culture. “In Dene society it is the grandfather who passes on the traditions and now there are too many men with no uncles, fathers or grandfathers to advise them,” says Cindy Gilday, Joe Kenny’s daughter, and chair of Deline Uranium Committee. “It’s the most vicious example of cultural genocide I have ever seen and it’s in my own home.”
Although the Atomic Energy Control Board and uranium companies have long argued that little was known about uranium’s hazards, evidence from U.S. and Canadian archives and survivors of the era tell a different story.
Unlike Ottawa, the U.S. recently declassified 250,000 documents on its atomic weapons and energy program, which reveal that government officials and scientists in both countries actively discussed uranium’s hazards in secret. Yet publicly they remained mute. The perils were well documented. As early as 1932, Canada’s Department of Mines published studies on Port Radium that repeatedly warned about radon’s poisonous effects on the lungs and “dangers from inhalation of radioactive dust.” The department’s own blood studies on Port Radium miners lead it to conclude “that a hazard may exist in the breathing of air containing even small amounts of radon.”
Wilhelm C. Hueper also knew this. In 1942 the founding director of the environmental cancer section of the U.S. National Cancer Institute reviewed 300 years of radon data on European miners. His conclusion: radon gas in cobalt mines routinely produced lung cancers that systematically killed more than half of all miners 10 to 20 years after their employment.
Hueper predicted a similar tragedy for radium miners in Great Bear Lake and the Belgium Congo. Warned the scientist: “In case the Belgian and Canadian operations should be conducted without the essential and comprehensive protective measures for the workers, the prospects for an epidemic-like appearance of lung carcinomas among their employees can be anticipated in the not too distant future.” Forty years later, two Canadian mortality studies confirmed Hueper’s foresight.
When Hueper began to issue similar warnings to U.S. uranium miners on the Colorado Plateau in the early 1950s, “the mine operators and politicians got all excited,” says Victor E. Archer, an epidemiologist who started the first cancer studies on U.S. miners in 1954 and is now a professor of occupational medicine in Salt Lake City at the University of Utah. Declassified U.S. documents also show that the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission told Hueper, a world expert on lung cancers, that references to occupational cancers among uranium miners were “not in the public interest” and “represented mere conjecture.”
Notes Archer: “The Canadians knew about the same things that the U.S. did and in general tagged along with the Atomic Energy Commission.” In fact Eldorado management and the Canadian government regularly received updates on radon and lung cancer studies on American uranium miners throughout the 1950s. But neither government nor mine owners wanted to scare miners away or implement better health safeguards that would force uranium prices up, says Archer.
“We always suspected that the Americans had more information about the hazards but we could never get the damn stuff,” recalls Hank Bloy, a retired engineer for Eldorado’s Port Radium and Beaverlodge mines in the late 1950s. “The Americans were buying our uranium and wanted it badly and didn’t cooperate too much on the health standards.”
In 1945, a federal research team from Montreal sent to monitor radon in the mine found conditions at Port Radium appalling. They reported that “the radon content seems to be so high as to be definitely dangerous to the health of those working in the mines.” Despite the installation of some fans in 1946, concerns about protection for miners at Great Bear Lake even became the subject of several 1949 memos at the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, which at that time bought all the mine’s ore. This information was so confidential that one memo said: “It should not be quoted in any published report.”
The next reference to ongoing radiation hazards at the mine surfaced at a secret 1953 meeting at Chalk River, Ont. When Canadian officials expressed concerns about high radon concentration in uranium mines, their American counterparts replied that “our problem is different because we have no concentration of uranium of any magnitude.” This was a lie: By 1953, the U.S. Public Health Services had established that American miners on the Colorado Plateau were being exposed to the same radiation doses as Hueper’s European miners.
Dr. André Cipriani, a Canadian biologist keenly concerned about health safety in the whole uranium industry, then reported “that there had been three or four cases of cancers in employees” at Port Radium. When the Canadian government finally sent two physicists to the area in the mid-1950s to check on radon levels at Port Radium’s sister mine on Lake Athabasca -- a mine with much lower grade ore -- they found lots of radon. But according to one retired senior civil servant, that report, like Hueper’s concerns, never saw the light of day. “We printed it in green covers, which means declassified, and sent a copy up to Chalk River. And the next thing I knew we got orders from the assistant deputy minister to collect every copy and get them back to the department because not one was to go out. That report was squashed. “I know that Eldorado was extremely cautious and didn’t want anything coming out and I guess they said, ‘For God’s sake, stop this!’ and it never came out,” says the pensioned official, who is still bound to silence by the Official Secrets Act.
Because this health information was withheld, Canada’s energy minister, Gordon Churchill, was able to declare in 1959 “that there are no special hazards attached to the mining of uranium that differ from other mining activities.” Notes Robert Bothwell, a University of Toronto historian and author of Eldorado, a lengthy history of the Crown company: “The profound and deliberate falsification of nuclear hazards began at the top.”
The Port Radium record was eventually repeated at uranium mines across Canada. When the Ontario government appointed James Ham to study mine safety at Elliot Lake, another Eldorado uranium property, in 1974, he concluded that “neither the workers nor their representatives were advised about the emerging status of the problem of lung cancer.” Although Elliot Lake has now been closed for nearly 10 years, former miners with lung cancer and other radiation related ailments make an average of one compensation claim a week in Ontario.
The Atomic Energy Commission still has not adopted the latest radiation exposure guidelines issued by the International Commission of Radiation Protection. The ICRP, based in Sweden, issued the recommended levels in 1991.
Later Canadian studies found just what scientists early on had predicted would be found. One pilot study on Port Radium found 10 cases of lung cancer among 76 men who had worked more than five years at the mine. They died between 1953 and 1975. Ontario and Newfoundland studies found miners exposed to radon had three to five times the average lung cancer rate. And on it went.
Watching a uranium miner die of a radioactive damaged lung is a job only for the brave. Al King, an 82-year-old retired member of the Steelworkers union in Vancouver, has held the hands of the dying. He recalls one retired Port Radium miner whose chest lesions were so bad that they had spread to his femur and exploded it. “They couldn’t pump enough morphine into him to keep him from screaming before he died.”
“The ethical issues raised by this case are profound,” says Andy Orkin, a well-known Ontario lawyer who advises the community and also represents the Cree of northern Quebec. “We did it to them. Somebody knew the stuff was dangerous. Even by standards of the day, they had a right to know.”
Before the mine, the Dene, a nomadic people, hunted and fished along the rocky shores of Great Bear, the world’s fourth-largest and least-studied inland lake. But the stability of that caribou life changed when the Dene unwittingly met the atom in 1930. That’s the year Gilbert and Charlie LaBine started to mine a rich load of pitchblende or radium just an eight-hour boat ride north of Deline (then Fort Franklin). According to the elders, a Dene hunter traded a sample of the black lustrous mineral to a Kentucky-born fur trapper, who then alerted the LaBines, failed gold-seekers. In exchange for the right to mine an ore then worth more than $70,000 a gram on world markets, the Dene received a few sacks of flour, lard and baking powder. “On that day, the babies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were doomed to death by the time they would become 15 years of age,” noted a 1945 Herald article on the historic mine.
Radium, which consists largely of uranium oxides, was then used for watch dials, medical X-rays and cancer treatments. It is just one of the radioactive byproducts of uranium, a constantly decaying metal that releases a wide spectrum of deadly energy particles, much like shrapnel from a grenade. Port Radium contained so much of its namesake that in 1932 the Herald hailed the find as a “treasure house” and “Great Bear’s rich citadel.” As a consequence, the mine immediately broke the world monopoly on radium held by a Belgium firm in the Congo.
Rather than ship tonnes of chemicals to Great Bear to refine the radium, Eldorado established a refinery in Port Hope, Ontario. It sold uranium as a waste product for $1.35 a pound or scattered radioactive tailings around the city -- a source of later scandals. Before the mine temporarily closed in 1940 due to the war and declining radium demand, the Dene supplied caribou meat for the miners and then worked as loggers, stevedores or radium coolies.
In 1942, the U.S. Manhattan Project -- the secret effort to turn split atoms into explosive bombs -- quickly revived the mine’s fortunes. Having no uranium sources of its own, the American government rapidly bought Port Radium stockpiles at the Port Hope Refinery and placed an order for 60 tonnes of uranium oxide. To advance the war effort, Ottawa secretly purchased the mine. Alberta’s wide-open spaces were even offered as possible test sites for the bomb.
It’s unknown how many tonnes of Port Radium ore fuelled the first test bomb, called “Trinity,” or even the war-stoppers -- “Fat Man” and “Little Boy.” A shipload of Congo ore sitting in New York harbor eventually made up the bulk of the supplies because Eldorado had trouble filling both American and British orders for the war effort. But the Manhattan Project mixed ores from Great Bear and Africa and all the uranium was refined at Port Hope.
“Nobody knew what was going on,” recalls Isadore Yukon, who hauled ores for three summers in a row during the 1940s. “Keeping the mine going full blast was the important thing.” To that end, the mine employed 250 white miners who battled frigid waters, poor ventilation (the mine counted on natural drafts to circulate air) and Port Radium’s remoteness. Miner turnover was high. While the whites mined the ore and sewed crushed ores into sacks, the Dene carried and piloted what they called the “money rock” out of Great Bear to Fort McMurray.
“When I was young,” recalled 66-year-old Alfred Taniton, who worked on the ore-ferrying boats for five years, “I saw some of the workers hauling ores. The whites would have showers but us native people didn’t. I guess they really wanted to destroy us... That’s why they never told us these things.”
His wife Jane, now 59, lived two years at the mine and ate herring from the dredging pond. Two years ago she had a cancerous kidney removed. “If they had told us the truth the people wouldn’t have worked for them,” adds Alfred.
In 1994, an advisory committee to President Bill Clinton published a study on “human radiation experiments” in the United States. It looked at the treatment of miners, many of whom were Navajos. Based on declassified documents, it concluded that “an insufficient effort was made by the federal government to mitigate the hazard to uranium miners through early ventilation of the mines and that as a result miners died… Because the federal government did not take the necessary action, the product it purchased was at the price of hundreds of deaths.” That summary should bring no comfort to Deline’s widows, nor to the widows of hundreds of uranium miners across Canada. But it explains a legacy of deception.
“Of all the world’s nuclear powers, Canada is the last hold-out on talking about its nuclear legacy and how so many things went terribly wrong,” says Gordon Edwards, a Montreal mathematician and president of the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility. “I could never understand why authorities were so resistant,” reflects Archer, whose epidemiology studies on American miners finally broke the official silence in 1961. “As I got older I saw the same thing with cigarette smoking and asbestos. I now believe that it’s a cultural thing. People are reluctant to change their minds and accept new ideas.”
“The first time I heard about this bomb was from an army veteran in the 1950s,” says Deline elder Paul Baton. “The soldier said he’d had respiratory problems, probably due to the war. He told us about the bomb and the aftermath and what it was made from. “He explained how they dropped the bomb and its effect on the Japanese. He said later, down the years, it will affect my land and my life… “We had no idea. We are a strong people. We stand by our words. The elders are worried about the water, the air and the land. We must keep it clean because other animals use the land… I have never talked about this before but now I am talking.”
In Deline, the elders -- the ones that survived their introduction to the nuclear age -- now go to the restored house of the prophet, the Grandfather, to speak to the dead. There are not many other grandfathers left.

Port Radium (Eldorado) Timeline

1932: Port Radium begins production. Mines Canada issues health warnings on radon gas and radioactive dust.
1939: Canadian ore used in first atomic chain reaction experiment.
1940: Port Radium closes.
1941: Port Radium reopens for war effort, as world’s first uranium mine.
1942: United States government orders 60 tonnes of uranium. Canadian government secretly begins to buy out mine. Dene work as coolies.
1945: Bombs dropped on Japan.
1949: U.S. officials raise health concerns about Port Radium miners.
1953: First Port Radium miner dies of cancer. United States government secretly begins health studies on U.S. miners.
1956: Value of uranium production hits $1 billion in Canada.
1957: Elliot Lake mine opens.
1960: Port Radium mine closes. No uranium left. First Dene dies of cancer.
1967: First radon standards set.
1974: First uranium miners with lung cancer compensated by Ontario.
1976: Ham Royal Commission slams government for hiding health information from miners. First Ontario studies published.
1979: First cancer death study on Port Radium miners.
1988: Canadian government merges Eldorado with the Sasktachewan Mining Development Corporation to form Cameco.